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Abstract
This paper studies the value of limited rate cooperation between the transmitters for managing
interference and simultaneously ensuring secrecy, in the 2-user Gaussian symmetric interference channel
(GSIC). First, the problem is studied in the symmetric linear deterministic IC (SLDIC) setting, and
achievable schemes are proposed, based on interference cancelation, relaying of the other user’s data
bits, and transmission of random bits. In the proposed achievable scheme, the limited rate cooperative
link is used to share a combination of data bits and random bits depending on the model parameters.
Outer bounds on the secrecy rate are also derived, using a novel partitioning of the encoded messages
and outputs depending on the relative strength of the signal and the interference. The inner and outer
bounds are derived under all possible parameter settings. It is found that, for some parameter settings,
the inner and outer bounds match, yielding the capacity of the SLDIC under transmitter cooperation
and secrecy constraints. In some other scenarios, the achievable rate matches with the capacity region
of the 2-user SLDIC without secrecy constraints derived by Wang and Tse [1]; thus, the proposed
scheme offers secrecy for free, in these cases. Inspired by the achievable schemes and outer bounds
in the deterministic case, achievable schemes and outer bounds are derived in the Gaussian case. The
proposed achievable scheme for the Gaussian case is based on Marton’s coding scheme and stochastic
encoding along with dummy message transmission. One of the key techniques used in the achievable
Major portion of this work was carried out, when the first author was at the department of ECE, Indian Institute of Science,
Bangalore.
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2scheme for both the models is interference cancelation, which simultaneously offers two seemingly
conflicting benefits: it cancels interference and ensures secrecy. Many of the results derived in this
paper extend to the asymmetric case also. The results show that limited transmitter cooperation can
greatly facilitate secure communications over 2-user ICs.
Index Terms
Interference channel, information theoretic secrecy, deterministic approximation, cooperation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interference management and ensuring security of the messages are two important aspects
in the design of multiuser wireless communication systems, owing to the broadcast nature of
the physical medium. The interference channel (IC) is one of the simplest information theoretic
models for analyzing the effect of interference on the throughput and secrecy of a multiuser
communication system. One way to enhance the achievable rate with secrecy constraints at the
receivers is through cooperation between the transmitters. In this work, the role of transmitter
cooperation in managing interference and ensuring secrecy is explored by studying the 2-user IC
with limited-rate cooperation between the transmitters and secrecy constraints at the receivers.
In practice, such scenarios can arise in a cellular network, where different users have subscribed
to different data contents, and are served by different base stations belonging to the same service
provider. In this case, it is important for the service provider to support high throughput, as well
as secure its transmissions, to maximize its own revenue. In these scenarios, the transmitters
(e.g., base stations) are not completely isolated from each other, and cooperation among them
is possible. As the base stations can trust each other, there is no need for secrecy constraints
at the transmitters. Such cooperation can potentially provide significant gains in the achievable
throughput in the presence of interference, while simultaneously guaranteeing security.
To illustrate the value of transmitter cooperation in simultaneously managing interference
and ensuring secrecy, a snapshot of some of the results to come in the sequel is presented in
Fig. 1. Here, the capacity of the symmetric linear deterministic IC (SLDIC) with and without
cooperation is plotted against α , n
m
, where m = (⌊0.5 log SNR⌋)+, n = (⌊0.5 log INR⌋)+,
without any secrecy constraints at the receivers [1]. Also plotted are the outer bound and the
achievable rate for the 2-user SLDIC with secrecy constraints at the receivers, developed in
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WT−SC: without secrecy constraint (C=m/4)
MM−OB: with secrecy constraint (C=m/4)
MM−AS: with secrecy constraint (C=m/4)
WT−SC: without secrecy constraint (C=0)
MM−OB: with secrecy constraint (C=0)
Fig. 1. Data rate normalized by m for the 2-user SLDIC. Here, C is the capacity of the cooperative link between the transmitters,
m = 400 bits, and n is set based on the value of α = n/m.
Secs. III and IV, respectively. Two cases are considered: no transmitter cooperation (C = 0)
and with cooperation between the transmitters (C = m
4
bits per channel use). The outer bounds
plotted for C = 0 with secrecy constraints at receivers show that, as the value of α increases,
there is a dramatic loss in the achievable rate compared to the case without the secrecy constraint.
The performance significantly improves with cooperation, and it can be seen that it is possible to
achieve a nonzero secrecy rate for all values of α except α = 1. This paper presents an in depth
study of the interplay between interference, security, and transmitter cooperation in the 2-user
IC setting. It demonstrates that having a secure cooperative link in a network can significantly
improve the achievable secrecy rate.
Past work: The interference channel has been extensively studied over the past few decades,
to understand the effects of interference on the performance limits of multi-user communication
systems. The capacity region of the Gaussian IC (GIC) without secrecy constraints at receiver
remains an open problem, even in the K = 2 user case, except for some special cases such as the
strong/very strong interference regimes [2], [3]. In [4], the broadcast and IC with independent
confidential messages are considered and the achievable scheme is based on random binning
techniques. The work in [5] demonstrates that with the help of an independent interferer, the
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of an independent interferer increases the interference at both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper, the benefit from the latter outweighs the rate loss due to the former. Some more
results on the IC under different eavesdropper settings can be found in [6]–[8].
The effect of cooperation on secrecy has been explored in [9]–[11]. In [9], the effect of user
cooperation on the secrecy capacity of the multiple access channel with generalized feedback
is analyzed, where the messages of the senders need to be kept secret from each other. In [10],
the role of user cooperation on the secrecy of broadcast channel (BC) with relaying, where the
receivers can cooperate with each other, is considered. The achievable scheme uses a combination
of Marton’s coding scheme for the BC and a compress and forward scheme for the relay channel.
The role of a relay in ensuring secrecy under different wireless network settings has been studied
in [12]–[14].
A linear deterministic model for relay network was introduced in [15], which led to insights on
the achievable schemes in Gaussian relay networks. The deterministic model has subsequently
been used for studying the achievable rates with the secrecy constraints in [16]–[18]. In [16],
secret communication over the IC is analyzed with two types of secrecy constraints: in the first
case, the secrecy constraint is specific to the agreed-upon signaling strategy, and in the second
case, the secrecy constraint takes into account the fact that the other users may deviate from the
agreed-upon strategy. The deterministic model has also been studied under different eavesdropper
settings in [17]–[19].
It is known that limited-rate cooperation between the transmitters or receivers can significantly
increase the rate achievable in the 2-user IC without secrecy constraints [1], [20]. In general,
the Gaussian IC with transmitter cooperation is more difficult to analyze than Gaussian IC with
receiver cooperation, even when there is no secrecy constraints at the receivers. For example,
when the receivers can cooperate through a link of infinite capacity, the model reduces to a
Gaussian MIMO multiple access channel (MAC). When the transmitters cooperate through a
link of infinite capacity, the model reduces to a MIMO BC. The capacity region of the general
MAC was characterized in 1970s [21], [22]. In the MAC, the boundary of the rate region can
be achieved if the receiver performs MMSE decoding and successive interference cancelation of
the input data streams. However, it took a long time for researchers to find a precoding strategy
which achieves the boundary of the BC rate region [23], [24]. Similarly, the IC with cooperative
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5receivers is easier to analyze than the IC with cooperative transmitters [1], [20]. Further, when
there are secrecy constraints at the receivers, the following difficulties arise in analyzing the
system with rate-limited transmitter cooperation.
1) There are a number of ways in which the transmitters can use the cooperative link for
encoding their transmission. The cooperation can involve the exchange of data bits, random
bits or any combination of the two.
2) It is difficult to obtain tractable outer bounds, since the encoded messages are no longer
independent due to the cooperation between the transmitters. In addition to providing
carefully selected side-information to receivers, the secrecy constraints at the receivers
need to be exploited in a judicious manner to obtain tighter outer bounds as compared to
the outer bounds that do not use the secrecy constraints at the receivers.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the role of limited transmitter cooperation in a 2-user IC
on interference management and secrecy has not been explored and is therefore focus of this
work.
Contributions: In order to make headway into this problem, first, the problem is addressed
in the linear deterministic setting. For the SLDIC with cooperating transmitters and secrecy
constraints at the receivers, achievable schemes and outer bounds on the secrecy rate are derived
for all possible parameter settings. This gives useful insights for the achievable schemes and
outer bounds in the Gaussian setting. Next, the schemes are adapted to the Gaussian case.
The proposed transmission/coding strategy in the Gaussian setting uses a superposition of a
non-cooperative private codeword and a cooperative private codeword. For the non-cooperative
private part, stochastic encoding is used [25], and for the cooperative private part, Marton’s coding
scheme is used [1], [26]. The auxiliary codewords corresponding to the cooperative private part
are chosen such that the interference caused by the cooperative private auxiliary codeword of
the other user is completely canceled out. This approach is different from the one used in [1],
where the interference caused by the unwanted auxiliary codeword is approximately canceled.
Further, one of the users transmits dummy information to enhance the achievable secrecy rate.
The major contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
1) One of the key techniques used in the derivation of the outer bounds for the SLDIC is the
proposed partitioning of the encoded messages and outputs depending on the value of α.
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6This partitioning of the encoded messages/outputs reveals what side-information needs to
be provided to the receivers for canceling negative entropy terms. In addition, partitioning
helps to bound or simplify entropy terms which are not easy to evaluate due to the
dependence between the encoded messages at the transmitters. Also, the partitioning of the
encoded messages/outputs provides a convenient handle for using the secrecy constraints
at the receivers efficiently in deriving the outer bounds. The outer bounds are stated as
Theorems 1-4 in Sec. III.
2) For the SLDIC, the achievable scheme is based on interference cancelation, transmission
of jamming signal (random bits) and relaying of the other user’s data bits. The novelty
in the proposed scheme lies in determining how to combine these techniques to achieve
rates that are far superior to that achievable individually by these methods. To the best of
authors’ knowledge, exchanging a combination of data bits and random bits between the
transmitters for the purpose of precoding has not been used in the literature. The details
of the achievable scheme can be found in Sec. IV.
3) Outer bounds on the secrecy rate in the Gaussian setting are derived and stated as Theo-
rems 6-8 in Sec. V. As the partitioning used in deriving the outer bounds for the determin-
istic case cannot be directly used in the Gaussian case, either analogous quantities as side-
information need to be found to mimic the partitioning of the encoded messages/outputs
or the bounding steps need to be modified taking cue from the deterministic model. This
is one of the key steps in deriving the outer bounds on the secrecy rate.
4) Using the intuition gained from the SLDIC, achievable schemes for the Gaussian case are
proposed, which use a combination of stochastic encoding and Marton’s coding scheme
along with dummy message transmission by one of the users. However, in the high
interference regime, stochastic encoding alone cannot ensure secrecy of the non-cooperative
private message, as cross links are stronger than the direct links. Hence, in addition to
stochastic encoding, dummy message transmission is used by one of the users to ensure
secrecy of the non-cooperative private message at the unintended receiver. In the Marton’s
coding scheme, the codeword carrying the cooperative private message is precoded such
that it is completely canceled at the unintended receiver. The details of the achievable
scheme can be found in Sec. VI.
5) Many of the results derived in this paper extend to the asymmetric case also, and these
DRAFT
7are mentioned as remarks after corresponding theorems, where applicable.
It is shown that with limited-rate transmitter cooperation, it is possible to achieve a nonzero
secrecy rate under all parameter settings except for the α = 1 case. In particular, for the very high
interference regime (α ≥ 2), it is possible to achieve non-zero secrecy rate for both the model as
compared to the non-cooperating case. In case of SLDIC, it is found, surprisingly, that in some
nontrivial cases, the achievable secrecy rate equals the capacity of the same system without the
secrecy constraints. Thus, the proposed schemes allow one to get secure communications for free,
in these cases. It is also observed that the proposed outer bounds for the SLDIC with cooperation
are strictly tighter than the best existing outer bound without the secrecy constraint [1] in all
interference regimes, except for the weak interference regime, where the bounds match. The
idea of using a common randomness to improve the achievable rates is an important upcoming
theme in multiuser information theory, and the proposed schemes based on sharing random bits
between the transmitters is in the same flavor. Thus, the results in this paper provide a deep and
comprehensive understanding of the benefit of transmitter cooperation in achieving high data
rate in the IC, while also ensuring secrecy. Parts of this work have appeared in [27] and [28].
Notation: Lower case or upper case letters represent scalars, lower case boldface letters
represent vectors, and upper case boldface letters represent matrices.
Organization: Section II presents the system model. In Secs. III and IV, the outer bounds
and the achievable schemes for the SLDIC are presented, respectively. The outer bounds and
achievable results for the GSIC can be found in Secs. V and VI, respectively. In Sec. VII,
some numerical examples are presented to offer a deeper insight into the bounds, to contrast
the performance of the various schemes, and to benchmark against known results. Concluding
remarks are offered in Sec. VIII. The proofs of the theorems and lemmas are presented in the
Appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a 2-user Gaussian symmetric IC (GSIC) with cooperating transmitters. The signals
at the receivers are modeled as [1]:
y1 = hdx1 + hcx2 + z1; y2 = hdx2 + hcx1 + z2, (1)
where zj (j = 1, 2) is the Gaussian additive noise, distributed as zj ∼ N (0, 1). The input signals
are required to satisfy the power constraint: E[|xi|2] ≤ P . Here, hd and hc are the channel gains
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Fig. 2. (a) GSIC and (b) SLDIC with transmitter cooperation.
of the direct and cross links, respectively. The transmitters cooperate through a noiseless and
secure link of finite rate denoted by CG. The equivalent deterministic model of (1) at high SNR
is as follows [1]:
y1 = D
q−mx1 ⊕Dq−nx2; y2 = Dq−mx2 ⊕Dq−nx1, (2)
where xi and yi are binary vectors of length q , max{m,n}, D is a q × q downshift matrix
with elements dj′,j′′ = 1 if 2 ≤ j′ = j′′ + 1 ≤ q and dj′,j′′ = 0 otherwise, and ⊕ stands for
modulo-2 addition (XOR operation).
The parameters m and n are related to the GSIC as m = (⌊0.5 logPh2d⌋)+, n = (⌊0.5 logPh2c⌋)+,
while the capacity of the cooperative link is C = ⌊CG⌋. The quantity α , nm captures the amount
of coupling between the signal and the interference, and is central to characterizing the achievable
rates and outer bounds in case of the SLDIC and GSIC. A schematic representation of the GSIC
and SLDIC with transmitter cooperation is shown in Fig. 2. The figure also shows the convention
followed in this paper for denoting the bits transmitted over the SLDIC, which is the same as
that in [1]. The bits ai, bi ∈ F2 denote the information bits of transmitters 1 and 2, respectively,
sent on the ith level, with the levels numbered starting from the bottom-most entry.
The transmitter i has a message Wi, which should be decodable at the intended receiver i,
but needs to be kept secret from the other, unintended receiver j, j 6= i. In the case of the
SLDIC, the encoded message (xi) is a function of its own data bits, the bits received through
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9the cooperative link, and possibly some random data bits. The encoding at the transmitter should
satisfy the causality constraint, i.e., it cannot depend on future cooperative bits. The decoding
is based on solving the linear equations in (2) at each receiver. For secrecy, it is required to
satisfy I(Wi;yj) = 0, i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j in the case of the SLDIC [29]. The details of the
encoding and decoding scheme for the Gaussian case can be found in Sections VI-A and VI-B.
In contrast to the SLDIC, the notion of weak secrecy is considered for the Gaussian case [25].
Also, it is assumed that the transmitters trust each other completely and that they do not deviate
from the agreed scheme, for both the models.
The results derived in the paper for the deterministic and Gaussian models under the symmetric
assumption can be extended to the asymmetric setting in many cases, and these are indicated
as remarks in the following sections. There are two ways in which the model considered in the
paper can be asymmetric: (a) when C12 6= C21, where Cij is the capacity of the cooperative
link from transmitter i to transmitter j (i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j). This is termed as cooperation
asymmetry. (b) The two direct channel gains and two cross channel gains need not be equal
to each other; this is termed as channel asymmetry. In this case, the channel is parameterized
by (m1, n1, m2, n2) in the deterministic case and (h11, h12, h22, h21) in the Gaussian case. In the
sequel, the phrase asymmetry is used to account for both channel and cooperation asymmetry.
III. SLDIC: OUTER BOUNDS
In this section, four outer bounds on the symmetric rate for the 2-user SLDIC with cooperation
between transmitters and perfect secrecy constraints at the receivers are stated as Theorems 1-4.
Theorem 1 is valid for all α ≥ 0, while Theorems 2, 3, and 4 are valid for α ≥ 2, 1 < α < 2,
and α = 1, respectively.
In the derivation of the outer bounds, the following difficulties arise:
1) Due to cooperation between the transmitters, the encoded messages are no longer inde-
pendent. Most existing outer bounding techniques (e.g.: [4], [5]) require the independence
of the encoded messages to simplify the entropy terms, hence are not applicable in this
case.
2) Determining when and how to use the secrecy constraints at the receivers along with the
reliability criteria is crucial in deriving a tractable outer bound.
DRAFT
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To meet these challenges, a novel partitioning of the encoded messages and outputs depending
on the value of α is proposed. This partitioning of the encoded messages/outputs reveals what
side-information needs to be provided to the receivers and helps to bound or simplify entropy
terms which are not easy to evaluate due to the dependence between the encoded messages at
the transmitter. This partitioning also reveals how to judiciously exploit the secrecy constraints
at the receivers in deriving the outer bounds.
The following relation is repeatedly used in the derivation of these outer bounds: conditioned
on the cooperative signals, denoted by (vN12,vN21), the encoded signals and the messages at the
two transmitters are independent [1], [30]. This is represented as the following Markov chain
relationship:
(W1,x
N
1 )− (vN12,vN21)− (W2,xN2 ). (3)
Finally, the overall outer bound on the symmetric secrecy rate is obtained by taking the minimum
of these outer bounds. The best performing outer bound depends on the value of α and the
maximum possible rate, i.e., max(m,n)1{C>0} + min(m,n)1{C=0} per user, where 1A is the
indicator function, equal to 1 if A is true, and equal to 0 otherwise.
In the derivation of the first outer bound, the encoded message xi (i = 1, 2) is partitioned into
two parts: one part (xia) which causes interference to the unintended receiver, and another part
(xib) which is not received at the unintended receiver. Partitioning the message in this way helps
to obtain an outer bound on 2R1 +R2, which leads to an outer bound on the symmetric secrecy
rate. The following theorem gives the outer bound on the symmetric secrecy rate.
Theorem 1: The symmetric rate of the 2-user SLDIC with limited-rate transmitter cooperation
and secrecy constraints at the receivers is upper bounded as:
Rs ≤
 13 [2C + 3m− 2n] for α ≤ 11
3
[2C + n] for α > 1.
(4)
Proof: The proof is provided in the Appendix A.
Remarks:
• Note that when α > 1, the outer bound increases with increasing n for a given value of
C. However, it is intuitive to think that the achievable secrecy rate should decrease with
increase in the value of α, i.e., the outer bound is loose in the high interference regime.
Interestingly, it is found that the achievable secrecy rate also improves with increase in the
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value α in the initial part of the high interference regime, i.e., for 1 < α < 2, even when
C = 0. This will be discussed in Sec. VII-B.
• The outer bound stated above can be extended to obtain an outer bound on 2R1 + R2 for
the asymmetric setting. Using a similar approach as used in the proof of this theorem, one
can also obtain an outer bound on R1 + 2R2. Note that, these outer bounds are applicable
over all the interference regimes. The outer bounds are as follows:
2R1 +R2 ≤ C12 + C21 +max {m1, n1}+max {m1, n2} − n2 +max {m2, n1} − n1,
R1 + 2R2 ≤ C12 + C21 +max {m2, n2}+max {m1, n2} − n2 +max {m2, n1} − n1. (5)
The next outer bound, stated as Theorem 2, focuses on the very high interference regime,
i.e., for α ≥ 2. In the derivation of the bound, the encoded message xi (i = 1, 2) at each
transmitter is partitioned into three parts, as shown in Fig. 3(a). The partitioning is based on
whether (a) the bits are received at the intended receiver, and are received at the other receiver
without interference, (b) the bits are not received at the desired receiver, and received without
interference at the other receiver, and (c) the bits are not received at the intended receiver, and
are received with interference at the other receiver. To motivate the development of the following
outer bound, first consider the C = 0 case. If receiver 1 can decode x1a sent by transmitter 1,
then receiver 2 can decode x1a as well, since it gets these data bits without any interference.
Hence, it is not possible to send any data bits securely on those levels. Data transmitted at
the remaining levels are not received by receiver 1, so they cannot be used for secure data
transmission either. Now, suppose a genie provides receiver 1 with the part of the signal sent by
transmitter 1 that is received without any interference at receiver 2, i.e., yN2a , (xN1a,xN1b). Then,
by using the secrecy constraint for the receiver 2, it is possible to bound the rate of user 1 by
I(W1;y
N
1 |yN2a). When α ≥ 2, it is possible to show that I(W1;yN1 |yN2a) = 0. When C > 0, by
using the above mentioned approach and the relation in (3), an outer bound on the symmetric
secrecy rate is derived for α ≥ 2, and is stated as the following theorem.
Theorem 2: In the very high interference regime, i.e., for α ≥ 2, the symmetric rate of the
2-user SLDIC with limited-rate transmitter cooperation and secrecy constraints at the receivers
is upper bounded as: Rs ≤ 2C.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Remarks:
DRAFT
12
(Tx− 1)
(Tx− 2)
x1a
x1b
x1c
x2a
x2b
x2c
x2a
x2b
x1a ⊕ x2c
x1a
x1b
x2a ⊕ x2c
(Rx− 2)
(Rx− 1)
CC
(a)
(Tx− 1)
(Tx− 2) (Rx− 2)
(Rx− 1)
C
C
x1c
x2c
x2b
x2a
x1b
x1a
y2a = x1a
y1a = x2a
y
(1)
1b
y
(2)
1b
y1b
y2b
y
(2)
2b
y
(1)
2b
x
(1)
2c
x
(2)
2c
x
(1)
1c
x
(2)
1c
(b)
Fig. 3. (a) SLDIC with m = 2 and n = 6 and (b) SLDIC with m = 3 and n = 5: Illustration of partitioning of the encoded
message/output.
• The outer bound in Theorem 2 can be extended to the asymmetric case under the following
condition
min {n1, n2} > m1 +m2, (6)
and the outer bound becomes
R1 ≤ C12 + C21, R2 ≤ C12 + C21. (7)
• Theorem 2 implies that, for α ≥ 2, it is not possible to achieve a rate greater than 2C,
regardless of m and n. In particular, when C = 0, i.e., without cooperation, it is not
possible to achieve a nonzero rate. However, in the other interference regimes, it is possible
to achieve rates greater than 2C (See Figs. 12 and 13).
The third outer bound, stated as Theorem 3 below, is applicable in the high interference regime,
i.e., 1 < α < 2. The derivation of the outer bound involves partitioning of the output and
the encoded message based on whether the bits are received with interference at the intended
receiver, or causes interference to the other receiver, as shown in Fig. 3(b). The outer bound on
the symmetric secrecy rate for the high interference regime is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: In the high interference regime, i.e., for 1 < α < 2, the symmetric rate of the
2-user SLDIC with limited-rate transmitter cooperation and secrecy constraints at the receivers
is upper bounded as: Rs ≤ 2C + 2m− n.
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The following theorem gives the outer bound on the symmetric secrecy rate for the α = 1 case.
In this case, both the receivers see the same signal. Hence, it is possible for receiver 2 decode
any message that receiver 1 is able to decode, and vice-versa. Therefore, it is not possible to
achieve a nonzero secrecy rate, irrespective of C. A similar reasoning also holds for the Gaussian
case, even though the receivers see independent noise instantiations.
Theorem 4: When α = 1, the symmetric rate of the 2-user SLDIC with limited-rate transmitter
cooperation and secrecy constraints at the receivers is upper bounded as: Rs = 0.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix D.
A consolidated expression for the outer bound, obtained by taking minimum of the outer
bounds in Theorems 1-4, is stated as the following corollary. In particular, the minimum of the
outer bounds in Theorems 1 and 3 is taken for the high interference regime, and the minimum
of the outer bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 is taken in the very high interference regime.
Corollary 1: An outer bound on the symmetric secrecy rate of the SLDIC, obtained by taking
the minimum of the outer bounds derived in this work, is given by:
Rs
m
≤

2β
3
− 2α
3
+ 1 for α < 1
0 for α = 1
2β
3
+ α
3
for 1 < α < 2, β > α− 3
2
or α ≥ 2, β > α
4
2β − α+ 2 for 3
2
< α < 2, 0 ≤ β < α− 3
2
2β for α ≥ 2, 0 ≤ β ≤ α
4
,
(8)
where β , C
m
.
Remarks:
• Under cooperation asymmetry, all the outer bounds developed in the deterministic model
still hold. This requires replacing 2C with C12 +C21 in the expression for the outer bound.
This is due to the fact that the entropy term H(v12,v21) can be upper bounded by C12+C21.
• There are cases where it is non-trivial to extend these bounds to the asymmetric sce-
nario (e.g.: Theorem 3). One of the key techniques used in the derivation of these outer
bounds is the partitioning of the encoded messages/outputs and careful selection of the
side-information to be provided to the receiver. This partitioning and side-information does
not easily generalize to the asymmetric scenario.
Next, the achievable schemes for the SLDIC are presented.
DRAFT
14
a2
a1
b1
b2
Precoding with other
Interference cancelation
a2
a1
a3 a3
b3
b3a3
b3⊕
a3⊕ b1
b2
b3
user′s data bits
(Tx− 1)
(Tx− 2)
(Rx− 1)
(Rx− 2)
(a)
Precoding with other
Interference cancelation
b2
a2
user′s data bits
(Tx− 1)
(Tx− 2)
(Rx− 1)
(Rx− 2)
b1
b2
a2⊕ b1
b2
a1
a2
b2⊕ a1
a2
e4
a5
d4
e4 e4⊕ a5
b5
d4⊕b5
a5
b5
d4
Transmission of
jamming signal
Random bit
ensures secrecy
(b)
Fig. 4. SLDIC: (a) m = 4, n = 2, C = 1 and Rs = 3, (b) m = 5 and n = 4, C = 1 and Rs = 3.
IV. SLDIC: ACHIEVABLE SCHEMES
A. Weak interference regime (0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
)
In this regime, the proposed scheme uses interference cancelation. It is easy to see that data
bits transmitted on the lower m − n levels [1 : m − n] remain secure, as these data bits do
not cause interference at the unintended receiver. Hence, it is possible to transmit m − n bits
securely, when C = 0, as shown in Fig. 4(a). However, with cooperation (C > 0), it is possible
to transmit on the top levels by appropriately xoring the data bits with the cooperative bits in
the lower levels prior to transmission. These cooperative bits are precoded (xored) with the data
bits at the levels [1 : min{n, C}] to cancel interference caused by the data bits sent by the other
transmitter. When C = n, it can be shown that the proposed scheme achieves the maximum
possible rate of max{m,n} bits. When C > n, C − n bits can be discarded and n cooperative
bits can be used for encoding as above, to achieve max{m,n} bits. Hence, in the sequel, it will
not be explicitly mentioned that C ≤ n. The proposed encoding scheme achieves the following
symmetric secrecy rate:
Rs = m− n + C. (9)
A high level description of the achievable scheme is illustrated in Fig. 4(a). The details of the
encoding scheme and the derivation of (9) can be found in [27].
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Remarks:
1) In this regime, the proposed achievable scheme meets the symmetric capacity of the SLDIC
without secrecy constraints [1] for all values of C (See Figs. 12 and 13). Thus, the secrecy
constraints at the receivers do not reduce the symmetric capacity region of the SLDIC.
2) In this regime, the proposed scheme does not involve transmission of a jamming signal (or
random bits), even when C = 0. In the next subsection, it will be seen that the transmission
of the jamming signal improves the achievable secrecy rate, when the capacity of the
cooperative link is not sufficient to cancel interference at the unintended receiver.
B. Moderate interference regime (2
3
< α < 1)
In this regime, the proposed scheme uses interference cancelation along with the transmission
of random bits. Without transmitter cooperation, it is possible to transmit at least m − n bits
securely, as in the weak interference regime. Depending on the value of C and α, with the help
of transmission of random bits, it is possible to send additional data bits on the higher levels
[m− n + 1 : m] by carefully placing data bits along with zero bits and random bits.
The proposed scheme achieves the following symmetric secrecy rate:
Rs = m− n +B(m− n) + q + C, (10)
where B ,
⌊
g
3r2
⌋
, g , {n− (r2 + C)}+, r2 , m−n, q , min {(t− r2)+, r2} and t , g%{3r2}.
In the above equation, the first term corresponds to the number of data bits transmitted securely
without using random bits transmission or cooperation. The term B(m−n)+q corresponds to the
number of data bits that can be securely transmitted using the help of random bits transmission.
The last term C represents the gain in rate achievable due to cooperation.
A high level description of the achievable scheme is illustrated in Fig. 4(b). The details of
the encoding scheme and the derivation of (10) can be found in [27].
Remark: In this regime, it is possible to transmit data bits securely in the higher levels [m−
n + 1 : m] by intelligently choosing the placement of data and random bits, in addition to
interference cancelation.
C. Interference is as strong as the signal (α = 1)
In this case, from Theorem 4, it is not possible to achieve a nonzero secrecy rate.
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D. High interference regime (1 < α < 2)
The achievable scheme is similar to that proposed for the moderate interference regime, but it
differs in the manner the encoding of the message is performed at each transmitter. The proposed
scheme achieves the following secrecy rate:
1) When (1 < α ≤ 1.5):
Rs = B(n−m) + q + C, (11)
where B ,
⌊
g
3r2
⌋
, g , (m−C)+, q , min {(t− r2)+, r2}, t , g%{3r2} and r2 , n−m.
2) When (1.5 < α < 2):
Rs =
 2m− n + C for 0 ≤ C ≤ 4n− 6m4n− 6m+ CT1 + CT2 + CT3 + rd for 4n− 6m < C ≤ n, (12)
where CT1 , min
{⌈
Crem
2
⌉
, 2m− n}, Crem , (C ′ − CT3)+, CT3 , min {2m− n, C ′′},
C ′ , C − (4n − 6m), C ′′ , ⌈C′
3
⌉
, CT2 , min {2m− n, (Crem − CT1)+} and rd ,
min {2m− n− CT3 , 2m− n− CT2}.
The details of the encoding scheme and some illustrative examples can be found in Appendix E.
Remarks:
1) When C = 0 and 1.5 < α < 2, the proposed scheme is capacity achieving. The outer
bound in Theorem 3 helps to establish this.
2) One can note that the achievable schemes for the moderate (Sec. IV-B) and high interfer-
ence regime (Sec. IV-D) use a combination of interference cancelation and transmission
of a jamming signal (random bits transmission). When precoding is done using the other
user’s signal, it cancels the interference and also ensures secrecy. In the technique based
on random bits transmission, the transmitter self-jams its own receiver, so that the receiver
cannot decode the other user’s data. But, in this process, transmitter causes interference to
the other receiver, thereby adversely impairing the achievable rate of secure communication.
Thus, self jamming in that form only helps if the benefit to the secrecy rate due to the
interference caused at the own receiver outweighs the negative impact of the interference
caused at the other receiver. However, when the jamming signal can be canceled at an
unintended receiver by transmission of the same random bits by the other transmitter, its
adverse impact is completely alleviated, leading to larger achievable rates.
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e1
d1
e1
d1
d1
e1
and vice− versa)
To cancel 2C random
bits at Rx− 1
(Tx− 1)
(Tx− 2) (Rx− 2)
(Rx− 1)
(a) Random bits sharing: Rs = 2.
b1
a1 b1
(Sharing of C data
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a1
b1
and vice− versa)
Tx− 1 can relay C
data bits securely on the
lower n−m levels
a1
(Tx− 1)
(Tx− 2)
(Rx− 1)
(Rx− 2)
(b) Data bits sharing: Rs = 1.
Fig. 5. SLDIC with m = 2, n = 4 and C = 1.
E. Very high interference regime (α ≥ 2)
In this case, when C = 0, it is not possible to achieve nonzero secrecy rate as established
by the outer bound in Theorem 2. However, with cooperation (C > 0), it is possible to achieve
nonzero secrecy rate. The proposed scheme uses interference cancelation, time sharing, and
relaying the other user’s data bits. In contrast to the achievable schemes for other interference
regimes, the transmitters exchange data bits, random bits, or both, depending on the capacity of
the cooperative link. The proposed scheme achieves the following secrecy rate:
1) When m is even:
Rs =

2C for 0 < C ≤ m
2
m
2
+ C for m
2
< C ≤ n− 3m
2
n
2
− m
4
+ C
2
for n− 3m
2
< C < n− m
2
C for n− m
2
≤ C ≤ n.
(13)
2) When m is odd:
Rs =

min{2C,m} for 0 < C ≤ m+1
2
m+min
{
C − m+1
2
, n− 2m} for m+1
2
< C ≤ 2n−3m+1
2
n− 2m+ 1
2
[
Cul1 + 2C
uu
1
]
+ 1
2
[
Cuu2 + C
lu
1 + C
ul
2
]
for 2n−3m+1
2
< C ≤ n,
(14)
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To cancel m
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Fig. 6. SLDIC with m = 2, n = 4 and C = 2: R1 = 2 and R2 = 3 is achievable in the first time slot. In the second time
slot, the role of transmitters 1 and 2 is reversed and users 1 and 2 achieve a rate of R1 = 3 and R2 = 2, respectively.
where Cuu1 ,
⌈
C
2
⌉
, Cul1 , (m−Cuu1 )+, Cuu2 , (C−C lu2 −Cr2)+, C lu1 , (C−Cuu1 −Cr1)+, Cul2 ,
C ll1 , C
ll
1 , min{2Cr1 , (m− C lu1 )+)}, C ll2 , Cul1 and Cr2 , max
{⌈
Cll2
2
⌉
,
⌊
Cul2
2
⌋}
, Cr1 ,
⌈
Cul1
2
⌉
.
The details of the achievable scheme can be found in Appendix F.
Remarks:
1) When 0 < C ≤ ⌈m
2
⌉, the capacity achieving scheme involves exchanging only random
bits through the cooperative links. This is useful in scenarios where the transmitters trust
each other to follow the agreed-upon scheme, but are not allowed to share their data bits
through the cooperative link. The outer bound in Theorem 2 establishes the optimality of
the proposed scheme. The achievable scheme is illustrated for random bits sharing and
data bits sharing for C = 1 in Figs. 5(a) and 5(b), respectively.
2) When m
2
< C < n− m
2
(
or m+1
2
< C ≤ n) and m is even (or odd) valued, the proposed
scheme shares a combination of random bits and data bits through the cooperative links.
In Fig. 6, a schematic representation of the achievable scheme for m = 2 and n = 4,
with C = 2 bits is shown for the first time slot. In the second time slot, the encoding for
transmitters 1 and 2 is reversed. In the second time slot, users 1 and 2 achieve a rate of
R1 = 3 and R2 = 2, respectively. Hence, a symmetric rate of Rs = 2.5 is achievable.
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Interestingly, it turns out that the symmetric capacity region of the SLDIC does not change if
the perfect secrecy constraint at the receiver is replaced with the strong or the weak notion of
secrecy, when the proposed scheme is capacity achieving. This result is stated as the following
theorem.
Theorem 5: The symmetric secrecy capacity region of the deterministic SLDIC with trans-
mitter cooperation satisfies the following relationship, when the proposed scheme is capacity
achieving:
Cperfect = Cstrong = Cweak, (15)
where Cperfect, Cstrong and Cweak correspond to the capacity region with the perfect, strong and
weak notions of secrecy, respectively.
Proof: Any communication scheme satisfying the perfect secrecy condition will automati-
cally satisfy the strong and weak secrecy condition. Similarly, a communication scheme satisfying
strong secrecy will automatically satisfy the weak secrecy condition. Hence, the following holds
Cperfect ⊆ Cstrong ⊆ Cweak. (16)
The achievable results in Sec. IV are obtained under perfect secrecy constraints at the receivers.
It is not difficult to show that the outer bounds on the secrecy rate in Theorems 1-4 do not
change if the perfect secrecy is replaced with the weak notion of secrecy. When the achievable
rates meet the corresponding outer bounds, the relation in (15) holds.
Finally, this section is concluded with the following remarks:
1) When C = n, i.e., the cooperative link is as strong as the interference, and when α 6= 1,
the proposed scheme achieves the maximum possible rate of max{m,n}.
2) In [31], it is shown that the proposed outer bound in Theorem 1 in Sec. III is tight for
3
4
< α < 1 and 1 < α < 1.5, when C = 0. Hence, the secrecy capacity is characterized
for these regimes of α also. However, the symmetric secrecy capacity region of the 2-user
SLDIC, when 1
2
< α ≤ 3
4
and C = 0, remains an open problem.
3) It is possible to extend the achievable scheme based on interference cancelation (involving
exchange of data bits between the transmitters) as well as the scheme based on transmission
of random bits to the asymmetric case for the deterministic model. However, it is not
straightforward to extend the achievable schemes which rely on the exchange of both data
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and random bits to the asymmetric case. The extension requires a careful re-working of a
scheme for sharing random bits and data bits in the asymmetric setting.
In the following section, outer bounds for the GSIC are presented.
V. GSIC: OUTER BOUNDS
In this section, the outer bounds on the secrecy rate for the GSIC with limited-rate transmitter
cooperation are stated as Theorems 6-8. The extension of the outer bounds from the deterministic
model to the Gaussian model is non-trivial, because of the following well known differences
between the models:
1) In the deterministic model, interference or superposition of signals is modeled using the
XOR operation. Hence, the levels do not interact with each other.
2) In the deterministic model, noise is modeled using truncation.
3) In the Gaussian model, due to finite rate cooperation between the transmitters, the differ-
ential entropy terms contain discrete as well as continuous random variables. This makes
the derivation of the outer bounds more difficult in the Gaussian case.
Due to the above differences, the partitioning used in the derivation of the outer bounds
for the deterministic case is not directly applicable to the Gaussian case. To overcome this
problem, either analogous quantities that serve as side-information need to be found to mimic
the partitioning of the encoded messages/outputs, or the bounding steps need to be modified
taking cue from the deterministic model. This is discussed in detail in this section.
The outer bound derived in Theorem 1 partitions the encoded message into two parts: xNia
(received at receiver j, j 6= i) and xNib (not received at receiver j, j 6= i). However, it is not
possible to partition the message in this way for the Gaussian case. Hence, in the derivation of
Theorem 6, sNi = hcxNi + zNj (j 6= i) is used as a proxy for xNia. In this section, the following
notation is used: SNR , h2dP , INR , h2cP and ρ , E[x1x2].
Theorem 6: The symmetric rate of the 2-user GSIC with limited-rate transmitter cooperation
and secrecy constraints at the receiver is upper bounded as follows:
Rs ≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
1
3
[
2CG + 0.5 log det
(
Σy¯|s¯
)
+ 0.5 log
(
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR INR
)]
, (17)
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where Σy¯|s¯ = Σy¯ − Σy¯,s¯Σ−1s¯ ΣTy¯,s¯,
Σy¯=

1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR INR 2
√
SNR INR
+ρ(SNR + INR)
2
√
SNR INR + ρ(SNR + INR) 1 + SNR + INR
+2ρ
√
SNR INR
 , Σs¯ =
 1 + INR ρINR
ρINR 1 + INR
 ,
Σy¯,s¯ =
 √SNR INR + ρINR INR + ρ√SNR INR
INR + ρ
√
SNR INR
√
SNR INR + ρINR
 , and
and det(·) represents the determinant of a matrix.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix G.
Remarks:
1) The outer bound in Theorem 6 for the Gaussian model can be extended to obtain an outer
bound on 2R1 +R2 under the asymmetric setting. The outer bound becomes1
2R1 +R2 ≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
C12 + C21 + 0.5 log
(
1 + SNR1 + INR1 + 2ρ
√
SNR1 INR1
)
+ 0.5 log det
(
Σy¯|s¯
)
, (18)
where Σy¯|s¯ = Σy¯ − Σy¯,s¯Σ−1s¯ ΣTy¯,s¯,
Σy¯ =
 Σy¯,11 Σy¯,12
Σy¯,21 Σy¯,22
 , and Σs¯ =
 1 + INR2 ρ√INR1 INR2
ρ
√
INR1 INR2 1 + INR1
 ,
Σy¯,11 , 1 + SNR1 + INR1 + 2ρ
√
SNR1 INR1,
Σy¯,12 ,
√
SNR1 INR2 +
√
SNR2 INR1 + ρ
(√
SNR1 SNR2 +
√
INR1 INR2
)
,
Σy¯,21 ,
√
SNR1 INR2 +
√
SNR2 INR1 + ρ
(√
SNR1 SNR2 +
√
INR1 INR2
)
and Σy¯,22 , 1 + SNR2 + INR2 + 2ρ
√
SNR2 INR2,
Σy¯,s¯=

√
SNR1 INR2 + ρ
√
INR1 INR2 ρ
√
SNR1 INR1 + INR1
ρ
√
SNR2 INR2 + INR2
√
SNR2 INR1 + ρ
√
INR1 INR2
 ,
(19)
1With a slight abuse of notation, Cij has been used to represent the capacity of the cooperative link from transmitter i to
transmitter j for both the deterministic and the Gaussian models in the asymmetric case.
DRAFT
22
where SNR1 , h211P1, SNR2 , h222P2, INR1 , h212P2, and INR2 , h221P1.
2) Using a similar approach as used in the proof of Theorem 6, an outer bound on R1 +2R2
can be obtained.
The outer bound on the secrecy rate presented in the following theorem is based on the idea
used in deriving outer bounds in Theorems 2 and 3 for case of the SLDIC. But, in the Gaussian
setting, it is not possible to partition the encoded message as was done for the SLDIC. For
example, in Theorem 2, a part of the output at receiver 2 which does not contain the signal
sent by transmitter 1 is provided as side information to receiver 1. Hence, the approach used in
the derivation of the outer bound in case of SLDIC cannot be directly used for the Gaussian
case. To overcome this problem, for the Gaussian case, first xN2 is provided as side information
to receiver 1; this eliminates the interference caused by transmitter 2. Then, the receiver 1 is
provided with yN2 as side-information. The outer bound on the symmetric secrecy rate is stated
in the following theorem.
Theorem 7: The symmetric rate of the 2-user GSIC with limited-rate transmitter cooperation
and secrecy constraints at the receiver is upper bounded as follows:
Rs≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
[
0.5 log
(
1 +
SNR + SNR2(1− ρ2)
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR INR
)
+ 2CG
]
. (20)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix H.
Remark: The outer bound in Theorem 7 can be extended to the asymmetric setting, and the
outer bound becomes
R1 ≤
max
0≤|ρ|≤1
[
0.5 log
(
1 +
SNR1 + SNR1 SNR2(1− ρ2)
1 + SNR2 + INR2 + 2ρ
√
SNR2 INR2
)
+ C12 + C21
]
. (21)
Using a similar approach as used in the proof of Theorem 7, an outer bound on R2 can be
obtained.
The outer bound presented in the following theorem is similar to the outer bound presented
in Theorem 4 in case of the SLDIC. This kind of outer bound exists in the literature (see,
for example, [18]), but for the sake of completeness, it is presented in the following theorem.
Unlike the results in Theorems 6 and 7, this outer bound does not depend on the capacity of
the cooperative link.
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Theorem 8: The symmetric rate of the 2-user GSIC with limited-rate transmitter cooperation
and secrecy constraints at the receiver is upper bounded as follows:
Rs ≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
0.5 log
[
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR INR− (2
√
SNR INR + ρ(SNR + INR))2
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR INR
]
.
(22)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix I.
Remark: The outer bound in Theorem 8 can be extended to the asymmetric setting, and the
outer bound becomes
R1 ≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
0.5 log
(
1 + SNR1 + INR1 + 2ρ
√
SNR1 INR1
−
(√
SNR1 INR2+
√
SNR2 INR1+ρ (SNR12+INR12)
)2
1 + SNR2 + INR2 + 2ρ
√
SNR2 INR2
)
, (23)
where SNR12 ,
√
SNR1 SNR2 and INR12 ,
√
INR1 INR2.
Using a similar approach as used in the proof of Theorem 8, an outer bound on R2 can be
obtained.
A. Relation between the outer bounds for SLDIC and GSIC
In the following, it is shown that at high SNR and INR, the outer bounds developed for the
Gaussian case (Theorems 6 and 7) are approximately equal to the outer bounds for the SLDIC,
when C = 0.2 In Fig. 7, the outer bounds on the achievable secrecy rate in Theorems 6-8 are
compared as a function of α, for CG = 0 and CG = 1, when P = 20 dB and hd = 1. This
validates that the approaches used in obtaining outer bounds in the two models are consistent
with each other.
In the following, for ease of presentation, it is assumed that 0.5 log SNR and 0.5 log INR
are integers. Recall that, the parameters m and n of the SLDIC are related to the GSIC as
m = (⌊0.5 log SNR⌋)+ and n = (⌊0.5 log INR⌋)+, respectively.
2When C 6= 0, from Fig. 7, it appears that the approximate equivalence of the bounds for the GSIC and SLDIC will still
hold.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of different outer bounds on the secrecy rate for the GSIC with P = 20 dB and hd = 1. In the legend,
OB stands for the outer bound.
1) Outer bound in Theorem 6: Consider the following bound in the proof of Theorem 6,
when CG = 0:
N [R1 + 2R2] ≤ h(yN1 ) + h(yN1 ,yN2 |˜sN1 , s˜N2 )− h(z˜N1 )− h(z˜N2 )− h(zN1 ) +Nǫ′′,
≤ h(yN1 ) + h(yN1 |˜sN1 ) + h(yN2 |˜sN2 )− h(z˜N1 )− h(z˜N2 )− h(zN1 ) +Nǫ′′,
or R1 + 2R2 ≤ 0.5
[
log(1 + SNR + INR) + 2 log
(
1 +
SNR + INR
1 + INR
)]
,
≈ 0.5[log(SNR + INR) + 2 log(SNR + INR)− 2 log INR], (24)
where the last equation is obtained for high SNR and INR. Using the above mentioned definitions
of m and n, (24) reduces to:
Rs ≤
 13 [3m− 2n] for α ≤ 1n
3
for α > 1.
(25)
The above is the same as the outer bound for the SLDIC in Theorem 1, when C = 0.
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2) Outer bound in Theorem 7: When CG = 0, the outer bound in Theorem 7 reduces to the
following, in the high SNR and high INR regime:
Rs ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 +
SNR + SNR2
1 + SNR + INR
)
,
= 0.5 log
(
1 + 2SNR + INR + SNR2
)− 0.5 log (1 + SNR + INR) ,
≈ 0.5 [logmax (SNR2, INR)− log(INR)] . (26)
Using the above mentioned definitions of m and n, (26) reduces to:
Rs ≤
 2m− n for 1 < α < 20 for α ≥ 2. (27)
The above is the same as the outer bound for the SLDIC in Theorem 2, when C = 0.
In the following section, achievable schemes on the secrecy rate for the GSIC are presented.
VI. GSIC: ACHIEVABLE SCHEMES
A. Weak/moderate interference regime (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
The achievable scheme is based on the approach used in Secs. IV-A and IV-B, for the SLDIC.
Again, the achievable scheme proposed for the deterministic model is not directly applicable to
the Gaussian case due to the differences between the two models mentioned earlier. In the case of
the SLDIC, the achievable scheme used a combination of interference cancelation, transmission
of random bits, or both, depending on the value of α and C. That scheme is extended to the
Gaussian setting, as follows.
The message at transmitter i is split into two parts: a non-cooperative private part (wpi) and a
cooperative private part (wcpi). The non-cooperative private message is encoded using stochastic
encoding [25], and the cooperative private part is encoded using Marton’s coding scheme [1],
[26]. For the SLDIC, data bits transmitted at the lower levels [1 : m − n] are not received at
the unintended receiver. Hence, these data bits remain secure. However, there is no one-to-one
analogue of this in the GSIC, so the scheme does not extend directly. In the Gaussian case, for
the non-cooperative private part, stochastic encoding is used to ensure secrecy. The transmitter i
encodes the non-cooperative part wpi ∈ Wpi = {1, 2, . . . , 2NRpi} into xNpi. A stochastic encoder
is specified by a conditional probability density fpi(xpi,k|wpi) (i = 1, 2), where xpi ∈ Xpi and
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wpi ∈ Wpi, and it satisfies the following condition:∑
xpi,k∈Xpi
fpi(xpi,k|wpi) = 1, k = 1, 2, . . . , N, (28)
where fpi(xpi,k|wpi) is the probability that xpi,k is output by the stochastic encoder, when message
wpi is to be transmitted.
The cooperative private message wcp1 ∈ Wcp1 = {1, 2, . . . , 2NRcp1} and wcp2 ∈ Wcp2 =
{1, 2, . . . , 2NRcp2} at transmitters 1 and 2 are encoded using Marton’s coding scheme. One of the
key aspects of the achievable scheme is in the proposed method for encoding of the cooperative
private message, which is chosen to ensure that this part of the message is completely canceled
at the non-intended receiver. This corresponds to the scheme used for interference cancelation
in the SLDIC. This serves two purposes: it cancels interference over the air, and simultaneously
ensures secrecy. The transmitter 2 sends a dummy message along with the cooperative private
message and the non-cooperative private message. Note that stochastic encoding is sufficient to
ensure secrecy of the non-cooperative private message. However, the additional dummy message
sent by the transmitter 2 can enhance the achievable secrecy rate, depending on the values of α
and C. In this case, both the receivers treat the dummy message as noise.
1) Encoding and decoding: For the non-cooperative private part, transmitter i (i = 1, 2)
generates 2N(Rpi+R′pi) i.i.d. sequences of length N at random according to
P (xNpi) =
N∏
k=1
P (xpi,k). (29)
The 2N(Rpi+R′pi) codewords in the codebook Cpi are randomly grouped into 2NRpi bins, with each
bin containing 2NR′pi codewords. Any codeword in Cpi is indexed as xNpi(wpi, w′pi) for wpi ∈ Wpi
and w′pi ∈ W ′pi = {1, 2, . . . , 2NR
′
pi}. In order to transmit wpi, transmitter i selects a w′pi ∈ W ′pi
randomly and transmits the codeword xNpi(wpi, w′pi).
In order to transmit a dummy message, transmitter 2 generates 2NRd2 i.i.d. sequences of length
N at random according to
P (xNd2) =
N∏
k=1
P (xd2,k). (30)
The 2NRd2 codewords in codebook Cd2 are randomly grouped into 2NR
′
d2 bins, with each bin
containing 2NR′′d2 codewords (and thus Rd2 = R′d2 + R′′d2). Any codeword in Cd2 is indexed
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as xNd2(w
′
d2, w
′′
d2), where w′d2 ∈ W ′d2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2NR′d2} and w′′d2 ∈ W ′′d2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2NR′′d2}.
During encoding, transmitter 2 selects w′d2 ∈ W ′d2 and w′′d2 ∈ W ′′d2 independently at random and
sends the codeword xNd2(w′d2, w′′d2).
For the cooperative private message, the transmitter generates the cooperative private vector
codeword xNcp(wcp1, wcp2) based on Marton’s coding scheme according to
P (xNcp,u
N
1 ,u
N
2 ) =
N∏
k=1
P (xcp,k, u1,k, u2,k), (31)
where uN1 and uN2 are auxiliary codewords. The choice of these codewords are discussed in
the proof of Theorem 9. Finally, the non-cooperative private codeword and cooperative private
codeword are superimposed to form the transmit codeword at the transmitter 1 and the non-
cooperative private codeword, cooperative private codeword and the dummy message codeword
are superimposed to form the transmit codeword at the transmitter 2:
xN1 (wcp1, wcp2, wp1, w
′
p1) = x
N
cp[1] + x
N
p1, and
xN2 (wcp1, wcp2, wp2, w
′
p2, w
′
d2, w
′′
d2)=x
N
cp[2] + x
N
p1 + x
N
d2, (32)
where xNcp is defined in (106) in the proof of Theorem 9.
For decoding, receiver i looks for a unique message tuple such that (yNi ,uNi ( ˆ˜wcpi),xNpi(wˆpi, wˆ′pi))
is jointly typical. Based on the above coding strategy, the following theorem gives the achievable
result on the secrecy rate.
Theorem 9: In the weak/moderate interference regime, the following rate is achievable for the
GSIC with limited-rate transmitter cooperation and secrecy constraints at the receivers:
R1 +R
′
p1 ≤ I(u1,xp1;y1),
R1 +R
′
p1 ≤ I(xp1;y1|u1) + min {CG, I(u1;y1|xp1)} , (33)
where R′p1 = I(xp1;y2|xp2,u2). The achievable secrecy rate for the user 2 can be obtained by
exchanging the indices 1 and 2 in (33).
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix J.
The achievable symmetric secrecy rate for the GSIC is stated in the following Corollary.
Corollary 2: Using the achievable result in Theorem 9 and time-sharing between transmit-
ters, following symmetric secrecy rate is achievable for the GSIC with limited-rate transmitter
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cooperation:
Rs =
1
2
[R∗1(1) +R
∗
1(2)] , (34)
where R∗1(1) and R∗1(2) are the achievable secrecy rates for transmitter 1 in the first and second
time slots, respectively, which are obtained by maximizing Rs over parameters θi, ηi and βi
(i = 1, 2). The achievable rates for users 1 and 2 in the first time slot are as follows:
R1(1)≤
0.5 log
(
1 +
σ2u+h
2
d
Pp1
1+h2cPd2+h
2
cPp2
)
− R′p1,
0.5 log
(
1 +
h2
d
Pp1
1+h2cPd2+h
2
cPp2
)
+min
{
CG, 0.5 log
(
1 + σ
2
u
1+h2cPd2+h
2
cPp2
)}
− R′p1,
(35)
R2(1)≤
 0.5 log
(
1 +
σ2u+h
2
d
Pp2
1+h2
d
Pd2+h2cPp1
)
−R′p2,
0.5 log
(
1 +
h2
d
Pp2
1+h2
d
Pd2+h2cPp1
)
+min
{
CG, 0.5 log
(
1 + σ
2
u
1+h2
d
Pd2+h2cPp1
)}
−R′p2,
(36)
where R′p1 = 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2cPp1
1+h2
d
Pd2
)
, R′p2 = 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2cPp2
1+h2cPd2
)
, σ2u , (h
2
d − h2c)2σ2z , σ2z ,
θ1
θ1+θ2
P1
h2
d
+h2c
, Pp1 ,
θ2
θ1+θ2
P1, Pp2 =
η1
η1+η2
P ′, Pd2 =
η2
η1+η2
P ′, P ′ = (P2 − (h2d + h2c)σ2z), Pi , βiP
(i = 1, 2) and 0 ≤ (θi, ηi, βi) ≤ 1. The rate equations for the second time slot can be obtained
by exchanging indices 1 and 2 in (35) and (36).
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix L.
B. High/very high interference regime (α > 1)
The achievable scheme is based on the approach used for the SLDIC in case of high in-
terference regime. The achievable scheme for the SLDIC in Sec. IV-D used a combination of
interference cancelation, relaying of the other user’s data bits, and transmission of random bits.
In the case of the SLDIC, as some of the interfering links are not present to the intended
receiver, the levels corresponding to these links can be directly used for the other user’s data
transmission. But, in the Gaussian setting, it is not possible to relay the other user’s data directly
in this manner. The relationship between the corresponding achievable schemes for the SLDIC
and the GSIC will be made precise in the following paragraphs.
In the proposed scheme, user 1 sends a non-cooperative private message (wp1) and a cooper-
ative private message (wcp1). The other user transmits cooperative private message (wcp2) along
with a dummy message (wd2). For the SLDIC, the achievable scheme required transmission of
random bits for ensuring secrecy of data bits, in addition to the data bits that were sent with the
help of cooperation. Similarly, for the GSIC, the proposed scheme requires stochastic encoding
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and transmission of a dummy message by the other user, in order to ensure secrecy of the non-
cooperative private message sent by user 1. It is important to note that stochastic encoding alone
cannot ensure secrecy of the non-cooperative private part of the message. For the cooperative
private part of the message (wcpi), the coding scheme is the same as that mentioned in Sec. VI-A.
The transmission of the dummy message xd2 by transmitter 2 can be considered as using
another stochastic encoder fd2, which is specified by a probability density function fd2(xd2,k),
with xd2,k ∈ Xd2 and
∑
xd2,k∈Xd2
fd2(xd2,k) = 1. The rate Rd2 of the dummy message sent by
transmitter 2 and the rate sacrificed by transmitter 1 in stochastic encoding in order to confuse
the eavesdroppers at receivers 1 and 2, respectively, are chosen such that the non-cooperative
private message sent by transmitter 1 remains secure at receiver 2, and receiver 1 is able to
decode the dummy message. At transmitter 1, the cooperative private message and the non-
cooperative private message are superimposed to form the transmit codeword (xN1 ). Finally, at
transmitter 2, the cooperative private message and the dummy information are superimposed to
form the transmit codeword (xN2 ). In contrast to the achievable scheme for the weak/moderate
interference regime, the dummy message sent by one of the transmitters i is required to be
decodable at the receiver j (i 6= j).
1) Encoding and decoding: The encoding for the non-cooperative private message at trans-
mitter 1 and the cooperative private message at both the transmitters are the same as described
in Sec. VI-A1. In order to transmit the dummy message, transmitter 2 chooses xNd2(wd2) for
wd2 ∈ Wd2. The codewords transmitted from the two transmitters are given by:
xN1 (wcp1, wcp2, wp1, w
′
p1) = x
N
cp[1] + x
N
p1, and
xN2 (wcp1, wcp2, wd2) = x
N
cp[2] + x
N
d2, (37)
where xNcp is defined in (106) in the proof of Theorem 9.
For decoding, receiver 1 looks for a unique message tuple such that (yN1 ,uN1 ( ˆ˜wcp1),xNd2(wˆd2),
xNp1(wˆp1, wˆ
′
p1)) is jointly typical. Receiver 2 looks for a index wˆcp2 such that (yN2 ,uN2 ( ˆ˜wcp2)) is
jointly typical.
Based on the above coding strategy, the following theorem gives the achievable result on the
secrecy rate.
Theorem 10: In the high interference regime, the following rate is achievable for the GSIC
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with limited-rate transmitter cooperation and secrecy constraints at the receivers:
R1 +R
′
p1 ≤ min [I(u1,xp1;y1|xd2), I(xp1;y1|u1,xd2) + min {I(u1;y1|xp1,xd2), CG}] ,
R1 +R
′
p1 +Rd2 ≤ min [I(u1,xp1,xd2;y1), I(xp1,xd2;y1|u1) + min {I(u1;y1|xp1,xd2), CG} ,
I(xp1;y1|u1,xd2) + I(u1,xd2;y1|xp1)] ,
R1 +R
′
p1 + 2Rd2≤I(xp1,xd2;y1|u1)+I(u1,xd2;y1|xp1),
R2 ≤ min {I(u2;y2), CG} ,
Rd2 ≤ I(xd2;y1|u1,xp1), (38)
where R1 , Rp1 +Rcp1, R2 , Rcp2, R′p1 , I(xp1;y2|u2), and Rd2 , I(xd2;y2|xp1,u2).
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix M.
The achievable symmetric secrecy rate is stated in the following Corollary.
Corollary 3: Using the achievable result in Theorem 10 and time-sharing between transmitters,
the following symmetric secrecy rate is achievable for the GSIC with limited-rate transmitter
cooperation:
Rs =
1
2
[R∗1(1) +R
∗
1(2)] , (39)
where R∗1(1) and R∗1(2) are the achievable secrecy rates for transmitter 1 in the first and second
time slots, respectively, which are obtained by maximizing Rs over parameters θi, ηi and βi
(i = 1, 2). The achievable rates for users 1 and 2 in the first time slot are as follows:
R1(1) ≤

min [0.5 log(1 + σ2u + h
2
dPp1), 0.5 log(1 + h
2
dPp1) + min {0.5 log(1 + σ2u), CG}]− R′p1,
min [0.5 log(1 + σ2u + h
2
dPp1 + h
2
cPd2), 0.5 log(1 + σ
2
u + h
2
cPd2)
+min {0.5 log(1 + σ2u), CG} , 0.5 log(1 + h2dPp1) + 0.5 log(1 + σ2u + h2cPd2)]
−(R′p1 +Rd2),
0.5 log(1 + h2dPp1 + h
2
cPd2) + 0.5 log(1 + σ
2
u + h
2
cPd2)− (R′p1 + 2Rd2)
and
R2(1) = min
{
0.5 log
(
1 +
σ2u
1 + h2dPd2 + h
2
cPp1
)
, CG
}
, (40)
where R′p1 = 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2cPp1
1+h2
d
Pd2
)
, Rd2 = 0.5 log(1 + h
2
dPd2), σ
2
u , (h
2
d − h2c)2σ2z , σ2z ,
θ1
θ1+θ2
P1
h2
d
+h2c
, Pp1 ,
θ2
θ1+θ2
P1, Pd2 , (P2 − (h2d + h2c)σ2z)+, Pi , βiP and 0 ≤ (θi, βi) ≤ 1. The
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achievable rate equation for the second time slot can be obtained by exchanging indices 1 and 2
in (40).
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix N.
Remarks:
• The terms R′p1 = I(xp1;y2|xp2,u2) and R′p1 = I(xp1;y2|u2) in Theorems 9 and 10,
respectively, correspond the loss in rate due to stochastic encoding. As the capacity of
the cooperative link increases, more power is assigned to the cooperative private message
and hence, the loss in rate due to stochastic encoding decreases.
• When 1 < α < 2 and CG = 0, the proposed scheme cannot achieve non-zero secrecy rate
without transmission of dummy message in case of GSIC. In the case of SLDIC, also, the
proposed scheme uses random bits transmission to achieve non-zero secrecy rate.
• When CG ≈ ⌈0.5 log (1 + h2cP )⌉, the achievable secrecy rate is very close to the outer
bound (See Fig. 17).
• In all the interference regimes, the proposed scheme always achieves nonzero secrecy rate
with cooperation (i.e., C > 0 and CG > 0) in case of SLDIC as well as GSIC, except for
the α = 1 case.
• The achievable schemes stated in Theorems 9 and 10 for the Gaussian case can be ex-
tended to the asymmetric case, when hji < hii (Theorem 9) and hji > hii (Theorem 10),
respectively. For Theorem 9, the condition hji < hii is required to enable transmitter i
to send the non-cooperative message securely to receiver i using stochastic encoding. For
Theorem 10, the condition hji > hii is required due to the fact that the dummy message sent
by transmitter i needs to be decodable at receiver j (j 6= i) and should not be decodable
at receiver i. However, for the extension, the choice of the auxiliary codewords for the
cooperative private message needs to be modified as mentioned in the proof of Theorem 9.
C. Relation between the achievable rates for SLDIC and GSIC
In the following, it is shown that the achievable rates for both the models are approximately
the same at high SNR and INR, when (0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
) and for all the values of the capacity of the
cooperative link. For ease of presentation, it is assumed that 0.5 log SNR, 0.5 log INR and CG
are integers. Without loss of generality, it is also assumed that hd = 1.
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Consider the lower bound on the secrecy rate for transmitter 1 derived in Corollary 2, when
the transmit power of the dummy message is set to zero. Correspondingly, notice that, in the
deterministic case, transmission of jamming signal (random bits transmission) is not used in this
regime of α. Consider the following power allocation
Pp1 = Pp2 =
1
h2c
,
σ21z = σ
2
2z = σ
2
z =
1
2
(
P − 1
h2c
)
,
and Pd2 = 0. (41)
For high SNR (SNR ≫ 1), the power allocation to the non-cooperative private message in (41)
is always feasible. With this power allocation, the two bounds on R1 in (35) reduce to
R1 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 +
1
2
[
1
2
(1− h2c)2
(
P − 1
h2c
)
+
1
h2c
])
− 0.5, (42)
R1 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 +
1
2
1
h2c
)
+min
CG, 0.5 log
(
1 +
1
4
(1− h2c)2
(
P − 1
h2c
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
− 0.5. (43)
First consider the bound given in (42).
R11 = 0.5 log
(
1+
1
2
[
1
2
(
1− INR
SNR
)2(
SNR−SNR
INR
)
+
SNR
INR
])
− 0.5,
(a)≈ 0.5 log SNR
4
− 0.5,
= m− 1.5, (44)
where (a) is obtained using the fact that for (0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
)
, SNR ≥ INR2 and SNR, INR ≫ 1.
When CG ≤ I1, the RHS of (43) becomes
R12 = 0.5 log
(
1 +
1
2h2c
)
+ CG − 0.5,
= 0.5 log
(
1 +
1
2
SNR
INR
)
+ CG − 0.5,
≈ m− n+ CG − 1. (45)
When CG > I1, the RHS of (43) becomes
R13 = 0.5 log
(
1 +
SNR
2INR
)
+ 0.5 log
(
1 +
1
4
(
1− INRSNR
)2(
SNR− SNR
INR
))
− 0.5. (46)
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One can show that R11 ≤ R13, and hence, the approximate achievable secrecy rate for high SNR
and INR becomes
R1 = min {m− 1.5, m− n+ CG − 1} . (47)
From (9), the result in the deterministic case for this range of α is
R1 = min {m,m− n+ C} . (48)
From (47) and (48), it is clear that the achievable results for both the models are approximately
equal for all values of CG, when
(
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
)
.
In the other interference regimes, it is tedious to establish a precise connection between the
achievable results for the deterministic model and the Gaussian model, due to the complexity of
the rate expressions of both the models. Nonetheless, it can be noticed that there exists a close
resemblance in the behavior of the rate plots against α for both the models (See Figs. 12 and 15,
Figs. 13 and 16).
VII. DISCUSSION AND NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Comparison with existing results
Some observations on how the bounds derived in this work stand in relation to existing works
are as follows:
1) When C = 0 and α = 1
2
, the achievable rate result for the SLDIC in Section IV-A
reduces to the achievable rate result for the SLDIC in [16] with semi-secret constraint at
each receiver. The semi-secret constraint at each receiver depends on trusting the other
transmitters.
2) When (0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
), the achievable rate result for the SLDIC in Sec IV-A is found to match
with the achievable result for the SLDIC in [1] (See Figs. 12 and 13). As α increases,
in [1], the receiver can decode some part of interference and can achieve higher rate.
Here, due to the secrecy constraints, the receivers cannot decode other users’ messages,
and hence, the achievable scheme is completely different. Also, for some values of α, the
achievable scheme proposed in this paper for the SLDIC requires the exchange of only
random bits through the cooperative link, in contrast with the achievable scheme in [1].
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Fig. 8. Achievable secrecy rate for the GSIC with large CG, and the capacity of GMBC with two transmit antennas and one
receive antenna at each receiver [32]. For the GSIC and GMBC the individual power constraints at each transmitter are P = 100
and P = 200, respectively. The channel gain to the intended receivers in both cases is hd = 1. In the legend, AS: proposed
stands for the achievable scheme proposed in this work.
3) When CG = 0, the system reduces to the 2-user GSIC without cooperation, which was
studied in [4]. The achievable rate result in Theorem 9 and Corollary 2 reduce to the
results reported in [4] in this case.
4) When CG = 0, the achievable result in Theorem 10 reduces to the achievable result in [5,
Theorem 3] for the high/very high interference regime (α > 1) for the wiretap channel
with a helping interferer.
5) When the capacity of the cooperative links are sufficiently large, then the GSIC with
transmitter cooperation reduces to a 2-user Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel (GMBC)
with two antennas at transmitter and one antenna at each receiver. The achievable rate
result in Corollaries 2 and 3 are found to be very close to the achievable rate result in [32,
Theorem 1] for the GMBC, as shown in Fig. 8.
6) The proposed outer bounds for the GSIC with limited rate transmitter cooperation in The-
orems 6-8 are compared with existing outer bounds for the GSIC with secrecy constraints
at each receiver [5], [33], when CG = 0, in Fig. 9. It can be observed that the outer bounds
derived in this work improve over the best known outer bounds in the literature even in
the absence of cooperation, i.e., when CG = 0.
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Fig. 9. Outer bound on the symmetric secrecy rate for GSIC with CG = 0, P = 100 and hd = 1. In the legend, TP stands
for the outer bound derived in [5], HY stands for the outer bound on secrecy rate in [33] and MM stands for the outer bound
derived in this work.
In the following sections, some numerical examples are presented for the deterministic and
Gaussian cases, to get insights into the bounds for different values of C, over different interfer-
ence regimes.
B. Numerical examples in case of SLDIC
In Fig. 10, the outer bound in Theorem 1 is plotted along with the achievable secrecy rate
given in (10) for the (m,n) = (5, 4) case. Also plotted is the per user capacity of the SLDIC
with transmitter cooperation, but without the secrecy constraints [1]. It can be observed that the
proposed scheme is optimal, when C = 1 and C ≥ 4. However, it is not possible to achieve
the capacity without the secrecy constraint, when C ≤ 3. When C ≥ 4, there is no loss in the
achievable rate due to the secrecy constraint at receivers. In Fig. 11, the minimum of the outer
bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 is plotted as a function of C, with (m,n) = (3, 6). Also plotted
is the achievable secrecy rate given in (14). From the plot, it can be observed that it is not
possible to achieve a nonzero secrecy rate without cooperation between the transmitters, i.e.,
when C = 0. The achievable scheme, which uses random bits sharing through the cooperative
link and interference cancelation, is optimal for C = 1. It can be observed the secrecy constraint
results in a positive rate penalty, in the sense that it is not possible to achieve the capacity
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Fig. 10. Outer bound on the secrecy rate of the SLDIC with m = 5 and n = 4. The capacity of the SLDIC without secrecy
constraints is known in the literature [1]. In the legend, OB and AS stand for the outer bound and achievable scheme derived
in this work, respectively.
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Fig. 11. Outer bound on the secrecy rate of the SLDIC with m = 3 and n = 6. The capacity of the SLDIC without secrecy
constraints is known in the literature [1]. In the legend, OB and AS stand for the outer bound and achievable scheme derived
in this work, respectively. In this case the inner and outer bound match for C = 0, 1, and are fairly close at higher values of
C. For C = 1, the capacity achieving scheme uses random bits sharing through the cooperative link.
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without the secrecy constraint, for C ≤ 5.
In Figs. 12 and 13, the outer bound on the symmetric rate is plotted against α for a given
value of C, along with the per user capacity of the SLDIC with transmitter cooperation, but
without the secrecy constraints [1], and the inner bounds for the SLDIC with secrecy constraints
at the receiver. In order to generate these plots, m is chosen to be 400 and n is varied from 0
to 4m, and the rates are normalized by m.
In Fig. 12, the achievable secrecy rate and the capacity without secrecy constraints [1] match
when 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
. Hence, for this regime, it is not required to derive an outer bound. When
1
2
< α ≤ 2
3
, in the absence of the secrecy constraint, the capacity increases with increase in
the value of α, as the receivers are able to decode some part of the interference. However,
with the secrecy constraint, the receiver cannot decode the other user’s message, and, hence,
the achievable rate decreases with α. When 2
3
< α < 1, the achievable secrecy rate meets
the outer bound at some of the points and the fluctuating behavior of the achievable rate is
due to the floor-operation involved in the rate expression. In this regime, the transmission of
random bits help to compensate for the loss in rate, to some extent. At α = 1, there exists a
point of discontinuity, as no nonzero secrecy rate is achievable. Intuitively, one would expect
that the achievable secrecy rate should monotonically decrease with α, because of the reasoning
mentioned above. Interestingly, the achievable secrecy rate increases with increase in the value
of α, when 1 < α ≤ 1.5, although the increase is not monotonic in nature due to the floor
operation involved in the rate expression. The increase in the achievable secrecy rate arises due
to the improved ability of the transmitters to jam the data bits at the unintended receivers by
sending random bits as, α increases. However, when 1.5 < α < 2, the achievable secrecy rate
decreases with increase in the value of α and the outer bound meets the inner bound. When
α ≥ 2, it is no longer possible to achieve a nonzero secrecy rate.
In Fig. 13, compared to the C = 0 case, the achievable secrecy rate is higher in all the
interference regimes due to the cooperation, except when α = 1. The cooperation between the
transmitters not only eliminates the interference, but at the same time ensures secrecy. Also, the
utility of random bit transmission decreases with increase in the value of C. Interestingly, it
is possible to achieve a nonzero secrecy rate even when α ≥ 2, and the achievable scheme is
optimal in this case.
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Fig. 12. Rate normalized w.r.t m for the SLDIC with C = 0. Although there exists a gap between the inner and outer bounds
with the secrecy constraint, they match at many points too. In particular, in the initial part of the weak interference regime, i.e.,
for 0 < α < 1
2
and regime (α ≥ 1.5), the capacity of the SLDIC is achieved by the proposed scheme.
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Fig. 13. Normalized rate w.r.t m for the SLDIC with C = 50. In this case, we obtain the capacity of the SLDIC in the initial
part of the weak interference regime (0 < α ≤ 1
2
) and in the very high interference regime (α ≥ 2).
C. Numerical examples in case of GSIC
In Fig. 14, the achievable result in Corollary 2 is plotted against α, for different values of CG,
with two types of power allocations. In the first case, no power is allotted for transmitting the
dummy message. The power allocations for the non-cooperative private message and cooperative
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Fig. 14. Comparison of achievable schemes in Corollary 2 with different power allocations: P = 20 dB and hd = 1.
private message are discussed below. For the SLDIC, in the weak and moderate interference
regimes, the data bits transmitted on the lower levels [1 : m − n] will not be received at
the unintended receiver. For the GSIC, this corresponds to transmitting the non-cooperative
private message such that it is received at the noise floor of the unintended receiver. In the
existing literature, this type of power allocation has been used for the private message3 in the
Han-Kobayashi (HK)-scheme [34], and hence, this special case is termed as HKPA (HK-type
power allocation) scheme in this paper. The remaining power is allotted for transmitting the
cooperative private message. In the second case, the achievable result in Corollary 2, which
involves transmission of a dummy message, is plotted. When CG = 0 and α > 0.4, the scheme
in Corollary 2 outperforms the HKPA scheme. The gain in the achievable rate largely arises
from the transmission of the dummy message. When CG = 1, the gap between the two schemes
decreases, except for the initial part of the weak interference regime. In Fig. 15, the achievable
symmetric secrecy rate in Corollaries 2 and 3 are plotted against α, for CG = 0 and P = 100.
Also plotted is the outer bound on the symmetric rate in case of GSIC without the secrecy
constraint at receiver [1]. While plotting the outer bound with secrecy constraint, the minimum
of the outer bounds derived in this work and outer bounds in [1], [5], [33] is taken for the CG = 0
3In [34], there is no secrecy constraint at the receiver and the terminology private arises due to the fact that this part of the
message is not required to be decodable at the unintended receiver.
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Fig. 15. Secrecy rate in case of GSIC with P = 100 and CG = 0. In the legend, OB stands for the outer bound and AS
stands for the achievable scheme. Interestingly, the achievable secrecy rate increases with increase in the value of α, when
1 < α ≤ 1.5. However, when 1.5 < α < 2, the achievable secrecy rate decreases with increase in the value of α.
case. When (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), the achievable secrecy rate decreases with increase in the value α. At
α = 1, the achievable secrecy rate becomes zero. The figure also reveals an interesting trade off
between stochastic encoding and dummy message transmission in the high interference regime.
Initially, as α increases, receiver i can decode more of the interference caused due to the dummy
message transmission by transmitter j, j 6= i, which, along with a relatively minimal rate loss
due to stochastic encoding, leads to a net increase in rate with α. However, with further increase
in α, the loss in rate due to stochastic encoding eventually outweighs the gain in rate due to
the receiver’s ability to decode the dummy message, as the transmissions need to be protected
against a stronger cross-channel. Hence, for α ≥ 1.5, the achievable secrecy rate starts decreasing
with α.
In Fig. 16, the achievable symmetric secrecy rate is plotted against α for P = 100 and CG = 1,
along with the outer bounds. For plotting the outer bound with secrecy constraints, the minimum
of the outer bounds derived in this work and the outer bound in [1] is used. When α > 1, the
achievable secrecy rate initially increases, and later decreases with α. Finally, the achievable
secrecy rate saturates when (α ≥ 2), and this is due to the fact that it is no longer possible
to transmit any non-cooperative private message and the gain in the achievable secrecy rate as
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Fig. 16. Secrecy rate in case of GSIC with P = 100 and CG = 1. In the legend, OB and AS stand for the outer bound and
achievable scheme, respectively.
compared to CG = 0 case is due to cooperation only. Hence, when CG > 0, the proposed
scheme achieves nonzero secrecy rate in all the interference regimes except for the α = 1 case.
Hence, as the value of CG increases, it is required to assign lower powers for transmitting the
dummy message and the non-cooperative private message. By assigning lower power to the
non-cooperative private message, the penalty in the achievable secrecy rate due to stochastic
encoding also decreases. In the following example, no power is allocated for transmitting the
non-cooperative private message and the dummy message.
In Fig. 17, the achievable symmetric secrecy rate is plotted against α for P = 100 and
CG = 10, along with the outer bounds. Here, the achievable secrecy rate and outer bounds are
very close to each other. In this case, both the users transmit cooperative private messages only.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This work explored the role of limited-rate transmitter cooperation in facilitating secure com-
munication over 2-user IC. For the deterministic case, the achievable scheme used a combination
of interference cancelation, random bit transmission, relaying of the other user’s data bits, and
time sharing, depending on the values of α and C. Also, outer bounds on the secrecy rate
were derived for the deterministic case. The novelty in the derivation of the outer bound lies in
providing side information to receiver in a carefully chosen manner, use of the secrecy constraints
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Fig. 17. Secrecy rate in case of GSIC with P = 100 and CG = 10. In the legend, OB stands for the outer bound and AS
stands for the achievable scheme. In the later part of the very high interference regime, the achievable secrecy rate matches
with the outer bound without secrecy constraint. Hence, there is no loss in the achievable rate due to the secrecy constraint at
receiver.
at the receivers, and partitioning the encoded message/output, depending on the value of α. The
study of the deterministic model gave useful insights for obtaining achievable schemes and outer
bounds on the secrecy rate for the Gaussian case. The achievable scheme used a combination
of Marton’s coding scheme and stochastic encoding along with dummy message transmission.
It was found that, with limited-rate cooperation, it is possible to achieve nonzero secrecy rate
in almost all cases, except when α = 1. A fundamental finding of this work is that a limited
rate secure cooperative link between the transmitters of a 2-user IC can greatly enhance the
achievable rates for secure communication. Future work could investigate the value of other
forms of limited rate cooperation between nodes. Another related problem could be the study of
the case where the nodes cannot completely trust each other. The achievable schemes and outer
bounds results proposed in this paper can give useful insight and facilitate further studies of the
IC with secrecy constraints.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Using Fano’s inequality, the rate of user 1 is upper bounded as
NR1 ≤ I(W1;yN1 ) +Nǫ1,
= H(yN1 )−H(yN1 |W1) +Nǫ1,
(a)
≤ H(yN1 )−H(yN1 |W1,xN1 ) +Nǫ1,
= H(yN1 )−H(xN2a|W1,xN1 ) +Nǫ1, where, xN2a , Dq−nxN2 ,
≤ H(yN1 )−H(xN2a|W1,xN1 ,vN12,vN21) +Nǫ1,
(b)
= H(yN1 )−H(xN2a|vN12,vN21) +Nǫ1,
or H(xN2a|vN12,vN21) ≤ H(yN1 )−NR1 +Nǫ1, (49)
where (a) follows by using the fact that the entropy cannot increase by additional conditioning
and (b) follows by using the relation in (3).
Adopting similar steps used to obtain (49), the following bound on the conditional entropy is
obtained.
H(xN1a|vN12,vN21) ≤ H(yN2 )−NR2 +Nǫ2, where, xN1a , Dq−nxN1 . (50)
The rate of user 1 can also be bounded as
NR1 ≤ I(W1;yN1 ) +Nǫ1,
(a)
≤ I(W1;yN1 ,yN2 ) +Nǫ1,
(b)
= I(W1;y
N
1 |yN2 ) +Nǫ1,
≤ H(yN1 |yN2 ) +Nǫ1,
(c)
= H(yN1 ,y
N
2 )−H(yN2 ) +Nǫ1, (51)
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(d)
≤ H(yN1 ,yN2 ,xN1a,xN2a)−H(yN2 ) +Nǫ1,
(e)
= H(xN1a,x
N
2a) +H(y
N
1 ,y
N
2 |xN1a,xN2a)−H(yN2 ) +Nǫ1,
(f)
≤ H(xN1a,xN2a,vN12,vN21) +H(yN1 ,yN2 |xN1a,xN2a)−H(yN2 ) +Nǫ1,
≤ H(vN12,vN21) +H(xN1a|vN12,vN21) +H(xN2a|vN12,vN21) +H(yN1 ,yN2 |xN1a,xN2a)−H(yN2 ) +Nǫ1,
(52)
where (a) is due to a genie providing yN2 to receiver 1; (b) is due to the perfect secrecy condition
at receiver 2, i.e., I(W1;yN2 ) = 0; (c) is obtained from the joint entropy H(yN1 ,yN2 ) = H(yN2 )+
H(yN1 |yN2 ); (d), (e) and (f): follows from the chain rule for joint entropy; (f) is obtained using
chain rule for joint entropy; and (g) is obtained using the fact that removing conditioning cannot
decrease the entropy.
Using (49) and (50), (52) becomes
NR1 ≤ H(vN12,vN21) +H(yN1 )−N [R1 +R2] +H(yN1 ,yN2 |xN1a,xN2a) +Nǫ1,
or N [2R1 +R2] ≤ H(vN12,vN21) +H(yN1 ) +H(Dq−mxN1 |xN1a) +H(Dq−mxN2 |xN2a) +Nǫ1. (53)
The above equation is simplified under the following cases.
Case 1 (m ≥ n): In this case q = m and (53) becomes
N [2R1 +R2] ≤ H(vN12,vN21) +H(yN1 ) +H(xN1 |xN1a) +H(xN2 |xN2a) +Nǫ1,
or R ≤ 1
3
[2C + 3m− 2n] . (54)
The above equation is obtained by using the fact that the entropy H(v12,v21), H(yi) and
H(xi|xia) are upper bounded by 2C, m and m− n, respectively.
Case 2 (m ≤ n): In this case q = n and (53) becomes
N [2R1 +R2] ≤ H(vN12,vN21) +H(yN1 ) +H(Dn−mxN1 |xN1 ) +H(Dn−mxN2 |xN2 ) +Nǫ1,
or R ≤ 1
3
[2C + n] . (55)
The above equation is obtained by using the fact that the entropy H(v12,v21) and H(y1) are
upper bounded by 2C and n, respectively. Also, given xNi , there is no uncertainty about Dn−mxNi .
Combining (54) and (55) results in (4). This completes the proof.
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B. Proof of Theorem 2
Using Fano’s inequality, the rate of user 1 is upper bounded as
NR1 ≤ I(W1;yN1 ) +Nǫ1,
(a)
≤ I(W1;yN1 ,yN2a) +Nǫ1, where yN2a , (xN1a,xN1b),
= I(W1;y
N
2a) + I(W1;y
N
1 |yN2a) +Nǫ1. (56)
where (a) is due to a genie providing yN2a to receiver 1. From the secrecy constraint at receiver
2, following holds.
I(W1;y
N
2 ) = 0,
or I(W1;y
N
2a,y
N
2b) = 0, where yN2b = xN2a ⊕ xN1c,
or I(W1;y
N
2a) + I(W1;y
N
2b|yN2a) = 0. (57)
As mutual information cannot be negative, I(W1;yN2a) = 0 and (56) becomes
NR1 ≤ I(W1;yN1 |yN2a) +Nǫ1,
= H(yN1 |yN2a)−H(yN1 |yN2a,W1) +Nǫ1,
(a)
= H(xN2a,x
N
2b,x
N
1a ⊕ xN2c|xN1a,xN1b)−H(xN2a,xN2b,xN1a ⊕ xN2c|xN1a,xN1b,W1) +Nǫ1,
= H(xN2 |xN1a,xN1b)−H(xN2 |xN1a,xN1b,W1) +Nǫ1,
≤ H(vN12,vN21,xN2 |xN1a,xN1b)−H(xN2 |xN1a,xN1b,W1) +Nǫ1,
(b)
≤ H(vN12,vN21|xN1a,xN1b) +H(xN2 |vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN1b)−H(xN2 |vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN1b,W1) +Nǫ1,
(c)
≤ H(vN12,vN21) +H(xN2 |vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN1b)−H(xN2 |vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN1b,W1) +Nǫ1,
(d)
≤ H(vN12,vN21) +Nǫ1,
or R1 ≤ 2C. (58)
where (a) is obtained by splitting the message into three parts as shown in Fig. 3(a); (b) is due
to the fact that conditioning cannot increase the entropy; (c) is due to the fact that removing
conditioning cannot decrease the entropy; and (d) follows by using the relationship in (3). This
completes the proof.
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C. Proof of Theorem 3
Using Fano’s inequality, rate of user 1 is bounded as
NR1
≤ I(W1;yN1 ) +Nǫ1,
(a)
≤ I(W1;yN1 ,yN2a) +Nǫ1,
(b)
= I(W1;y
N
1 |yN2a) +Nǫ1,
= H(yN1 |xN1a)−H(yN1 |xN1a,W1) +Nǫ1,
≤ H(yN1 ,vN12,vN21|xN1a)−H(yN1 |xN1a,W1) +Nǫ1,
≤ H(vN12,vN21|xN1a) +H(yN1 |vN12,vN21,xN1a)−H(yN1 |vN12,vN21,xN1a,W1) +Nǫ1,
≤ H(vN12,vN21) +H(yN1 |vN12,vN21,xN1a)−H(yN1 |vN12,vN21,xN1a,W1) +Nǫ1,
(c)
= H(vN12,v
N
21) +H(x
N
2a,y
N
1b|vN12,vN21,xN1a)−H(xN2a,yN1b|vN12,vN21,xN1a,W1) +Nǫ1,
= H(vN12,v
N
21) +H(x
N
2a|vN12,vN21,xN1a)+H(yN1b|vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a)−H(xN2a|vN12,vN21,xN1a,W1)
−H(yN1b|vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a,W1)+Nǫ1,
(d)
= H(vN12,v
N
21) +H(y
N
1b|vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a)−H(yN1b|vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a,W1) +Nǫ1, (59)
where (a) is due to a genie providing yN2a to receiver 1; (b) is obtained using the secrecy constraint
at receiver 2; (c) is obtained by partitioning of the encoded message and output as shown in
Fig. 3(b); and (d) is obtained using the relation in (3).
Once again, as the encoded messages at transmitters are correlated, it is not straightforward
to bound or simplify the entropy terms in (59). To overcome this problem, the output y1b is
partitioned into two parts as follows:
• y
(1)
1b : contains x1a sent by transmitter 1 and the interference caused by transmitter 2 due to
transmission on the levels [2m− n+ 1 : m]
• y
(2)
1b : contains x1b sent by transmitter 1 and the interference caused by transmitter 2 due to
transmission on the levels [1 : 2m− n]
The partitioning of y1b = (y(1)1b ,y
(2)
1b ) is illustrated in the Fig. 3(b). Now consider the second
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term in (59):
H(yN1b|vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a) = H(y(1)N1b ,y(2)N1b |vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a),
= H(xN2b,x
(1)N
2c |vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a) +H(y(2)N1b |vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a,y(1)N1b ),
= H(xN2b,x
(1)N
2c |vN12,vN21,xN2a) +H(y(2)N1b |vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a,y(1)N1b ),
(60)
where x(1)ic and x
(2)
ic correspond to the bits transmitted on the levels [min(n−m, 2m− n) + 1 :
n−m−min(n−m, 2m− n) + 1] and [1 : min(n−m, 2m− n)] of transmitter i, respectively.
The above equation is obtained using the fact that I(xN2b,x
(1)N
2c ;x
N
1a|vN12,vN21,xN2a) = 0. This
can be obtained using the relation in (3). In a similar way, the third term in (59) can be simplified
as follows:
H(yN1b|vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a,W1) = H(xN2b,x(1)N2c |vN12,vN21,xN2a) +H(y(2)N1b |vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a,y(1)N1b ,W1).
(61)
From (60) and (61), and dropping the last term in (61), (59) becomes
NR1 ≤ H(vN12,vN21) +H(y(2)N1b |vN12,vN21,xN1a,xN2a,y(1)N1b ) +Nǫ1,
or R1 ≤ H(v12,v21) +H(y(2)1b ) ≤ 2C + 2m− n. (62)
In the above equation, the term H(v12,v21) is upper bounded by 2C. From the definition of
y
(2)
1b , it can be seen that the term H(y
(2)
1b ) can be upper bounded by 2m−n. This completes the
proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Using Fano’s inequality, the rate of user-1 is upper bounded as
NR1 ≤ I(W1;yN1 ) +Nǫ1
(a)
= I(W1;y
N
2 ) +Nǫ1,
or R1
(b)
= 0, (63)
where (a) is obtained using the fact that y1 = y2 and (b) is obtained using the perfect secrecy
condition. This completes the proof.
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E. Details of the achievable scheme for the SLDIC when (1 < α < 2)
1) When (1 < α ≤ 1.5): The achievable scheme uses transmission of random bits, interference
cancelation, or both, depending on the capacity of the cooperative link. The bits received through
the cooperative links are transmitted on the levels [1 : C]. As the n − m lower levels are not
present to the intended receiver, these levels can be used for relaying other user’s data bits. Any
data bits transmitted on the levels higher than n − m will cause interference. The cooperative
data bits transmitted by transmitter i on levels higher than n−m [n−m+ 1 : C] are canceled
by transmitter j by transmitting the same data bits along with the data bits of user i (i 6= j).
In the remaining higher levels, it is possible to transmit data bits securely with the help
of transmission of random bits. The transmission of random bits is similar to that in case of
moderate interference regime. The message of transmitter 1 is encoded as follows
• Case 1 ((t− r2)+ = 0)):
x1 =
 aep×1
0s×1
⊕
 0e(n−C)×1
bC×1
⊕
 0ev×1
al(C−r2)+×1
 , (64)
where ae , [d1,u2, z3,d4,u5, z6, . . . ,d3B−2,u3B−1, z3B, ]T , ul , [an−(l−1)r2 ,
an−(l−1)r2−1, . . . , an−lr2+1], dl ,
[
dn−(l−1)r2 , dn−(l−1)r2−1, . . . , dn−lr2+1
]
, zl is a zero vector
of size 1 × r2, b , [bC , bC−1, . . . , b1]T , al = [aC , aC−1, . . . , ar2+1]T p , 3Br2, s , n − p
and v , (n− (C − r2)+).
• Case 2 ((t− r2)+ 6= 0):
xmod1 = x1 ⊕

0w×1
a′t×1
0s×1
 , (65)
where x1 is as defined in (64), a′ , [d11,d12,u11,u12, z′]T , u11 = [an−3Br2−q−v′ ,
an−3Br2−q−v′−1, . . . , an−3Br2−2q−v′+1], d11 , [dn−3Br2 , dn−3Br2−1, . . . , dn−3Br2−q+1]. Also,
d12 and u12 are zero vectors of size 1 × v′ and z′ is a zero vector of size 1 × f . Here,
v′ , (n−m− q)+, f , (t− 2(q + v′))+, s , n−m+ C and w , (n− t− s)+.
The proposed encoding scheme achieves the following symmetric secrecy rate:
Rs = B(n−m) + C + q. (66)
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2) When (1.5 < α < 2): The links in the SLDIC can be classified into three categories: Type
I, Type II, and Type III, as shown in Fig. 18(a). The classification is based on whether the data
bits are received cleanly or with interference at the intended receiver, and whether or not they
are present to the intended receiver.
Case 1 When (0 ≤ C ≤ 4n − 6m): In this case, the achievable scheme uses a combination of
interference cancelation, transmission of random bits and relaying of other user’s data bits. The
data bits transmitted by transmitter i on the levels associated with Type II links [n−m+1 : m]
will be received at the unintended receiver j (j 6= i). In order to ensure secrecy, transmitter
j transmits random bits on the levels [2(n − m) + 1 : n]. The remaining levels can be used
for transmitting other user’s data bits received through cooperation. The cooperative bits are
transmitted on the levels corresponding to Type I and Type III links. The C1 = ⌊C2 ⌋ data bits
transmitted by transmitter i for transmitter j on the levels corresponding to Type III links will
not be received at the receiver i and hence, will remain secure. The data bits transmitted on the
levels corresponding to Type I links by transmitter i for transmitter j will cause interference at
receiver i. The interference is required to be canceled by transmitter j by transmitting the same
bits.
The achievable scheme is shown for m = 5 and n = 8 for C = 2 in Fig. 18(b). The message
of transmitter 1 is encoded as follows
x1 =

dl×1
0(n−l)×1

⊕

0(n−m)×1
al×1
0(n−m)×1

⊕

0(n−m−C2)×1
buC2×1
0l×1
blC1×1
0(n−m−C1)×1

⊕

0m×1
a′C2×1
0(n−m−C2)×1

, (67)
where d , [dn, dn−1, . . . , dn−l+1]T , a , [al, al−1, . . . , a1]T , bl , [bn−m, an−m−1, . . . , bn−m−C1+1]T ,
bu , [bm+C2 , bm+C2−1, . . . , bm+1]
T
, a′ , [am+C2 , am+C2−1, . . . , am+1]
T and l , 2m − n. The
proposed scheme achieves the following secrecy rate
Rs = 2m− n+ C. (68)
Case 2 When (4n−6m < C ≤ n): In this case, 4n−6m cooperative data bits out of C cooperative
bits obtained through cooperation are used in a similar way as described in the previous case.
Define C1 , C2 , 2n − 3m. The remaining cooperative bits C ′ , C − (4n − 6m) is used as
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explained below. Let C ′′ ,
⌈
C′
3
⌉
. The number of data bits that can be relayed by transmitter i
for transmitter j on the lower levels corresponding to Type III links is CT3 = min {2m− n, C ′′}.
The remaining cooperative bits Crem = (C ′ −CT3)+ are transmitted on the levels corresponding
to Type I and II links. The CT1 , min
{⌈
Crem
2
⌉
, 2m− n} cooperative bits sent by transmitter i
causes interference at receiver i. These bits are canceled by transmitter j by sending the same
CT1 bits. The remaining CT2 = min {2m− n, (Crem − CT1)+} bits are transmitted on the Type
II links by transmitter i. These data bits cause interference at receiver i, which is canceled by
transmitter j. The number of data bits that can be sent on the Type II links with the help of
transmission of random bits is rd = min {(2m− n− CT3)+, 2m− n− CT2}. The achievable
scheme is shown for m = 5, n = 8 and C = 4 in Fig. 18. The message of transmitter 1 is
encoded as follows.
x1 =

0(2m−n)×1
bu(2n−3m)×1
0(2m−n)×1
bl(2n−3m)×1
0(2m−n)×1

⊕

0(n−m−CT1 )
+×1
b′
u
CT1×1
0(m−CT3 )×1
b′
l
CT3×1

⊕

0(m−CT2 )×1
bmCT2×1
0(n−m)×1

⊕

0m×1
au(2n−3m)×1
0(2m−n−CT2 )×1
amCT2×1

⊕

0(m−CT1 )×1
a′
u
CT1×1
0m(n−m)×1
⊕

drd×1
0(n−m−rd)×1
aerd×1
0(m−rd)×1
 , (69)
where bl , [bn−m, dn−m−1, . . . , b2m−n+1]T , bu , [b2(n−m), d2(n−m)−1, . . . , bm+1]T , b′l , [bCT3 ,
bCT3−1, . . . , b1]
T
, b′
u
, [b2(n−m)+CT1 , b2(n−m)+CT1−1, . . . , b2(n−m)+1]
T
, b′
m
, [bn−m+CT2 , bn−m+CT2−1,
. . . , bn−m+1]
T
, au , [a2(n−m), a2(n−m)−1, . . . , am+1]
T
, am , [an−m+CT2 , an−m+CT2−1, . . . , an−m+1]
T
,
a′
u
, [a2(n−m)+CT1 , a2(n−m)+CT1−1, . . . , a2(n−m)+1]
T
, d , [dn, dn−1, . . . , dn−rd+1]
T and ae ,
[a2m−n, a2m−n−1, . . . , a2m−n−rd+1]
T
. The proposed scheme achieves the following secrecy rate
RS = 4n− 6m+ CT1 + CT2 + CT3 + rd. (70)
F. Details of the achievable scheme for the SLDIC when (α ≥ 2)
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Type I links
Type II links
Type III links
Type I links
Type II links
Type III links
Tx−1
Tx−2
Rx−1
Rx−2
(a)
Tx−1
Tx−2
Rx−1
Rx−2
d7
a1
d8
e8
e7
a6
a2
a6⊕
b6⊕ a3
a1
d7⊕b1
e8
a6
d8⊕b2
a3
a2
d8
d7
b6
b1
b2
b3
e8⊕a2
e7⊕a1
b2
b1
b6
e7
b3
C = 2
(b)
Tx−1
Tx−2
Rx−1
Rx−2
d8
e8
a6
a2
a6⊕
b6⊕ a3
e8
a6
d8⊕b2
a3
a2
d8
b6
b2
b3
e8⊕a2b2
b6
b3
b7
b1
a7
0
a7
b7
a1
a7
0
b7
C = 4
b1 ⊕ b7
a1 ⊕ a7
(c)
Fig. 18. SLDIC with m = 5 and n = 8: (a) Different types of links, (b) C = 2, RS = 4 (c) C = 4, RS = 5.
1) When 0 < C ≤ m
2
and m is even: In this case, interestingly, transmitters share only random
bits through the cooperative links. Each transmitter generates C random bits independent of data
bits with Bern
(
1
2
)
. The achievable scheme involves transmitting the data bits xored with the
random bits. The same random bits are transmitted by the other transmitter, so as to cancel
them out at the desired receiver. In contrast to the achievable schemes in Secs. IV-B and IV-D,
the random bits transmission causes jamming to the unintended receiver only. Through careful
observation it is found that sharing random bits through the cooperative links can achieve higher
secrecy rate compared to sharing data bits only.
In this case, the signal of transmitter 1 is encoded as follows:
x1 =

0(m−2C)+×1
a2C×1
0(n−m)×1
⊕

0(n−2C)×1
d12C×1
⊕

0(m−2C)+×1
d22C×1
0(n−m)×1
 , (71)
where a , [a2C , a2C−1, . . . , a1]T , d1 , [eC , dC, . . . , e1, d1]T and d2 , [dC , eC , . . . , d1, e1]T .
The proposed scheme achieves the following secrecy rate:
Rs = 2C. (72)
Note that, with data bits sharing, the achievable scheme achieves
Rs = C. (73)
Hence, under the proposed scheme, one can achieve higher rate by sharing random bits than by
sharing the data bits.
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2) When (m
2
< C ≤ n− 3m
2
) and m is even: In this case, the transmitters exchange m
2
random
bits and (C − m
2
) data bits. The random bits are used in an analogous fashion as described in
the previous subsection. The links corresponding to the levels from [m+ 1 : n−m] are present
only at the unintended receiver and data bits transmitted on these levels are received without
interference at the unintended receiver. Hence, any data bits of the other user relayed using these
levels will remain secure. In this case, the signal of transmitter 1 is encoded as follows:
x1 =

am×1
0(n−m)×1
⊕

0(n−m)×1
d1m×1
⊕

d2m×1
0(n−m)×1
⊕

0(n−C−m
2
)×1
bc(C−m
2
)×1
0m×1
 , (74)
where a , [am, am−1, . . . , a1]T ,d1 , [em
2
, dm
2
, . . . , e1, d1]
T
, d2 , [dm
2
, em
2
, . . . , d1, e1]
T and
bc , [bm
2
+C , bm
2
+C−1, . . . , bm+1]
T
.
The proposed scheme achieves the following secrecy rate:
Rs =
m
2
+ C. (75)
3) When (n− 3m
2
< C < n− m
2
) and m is even: The novelty of the proposed scheme is in
precoding the data bits of the user partly with the other user’s data bits and/or with random bits.
The random bits used for precoding may be generated at its own transmitter or obtained from
the other transmitter through the cooperative link. Then, by appropriately transmitting data bits
or random bits on the levels of the SLDIC, the random bits are canceled at the intended receiver,
or the data bits of the other user are canceled out at the unintended receiver. The details of the
achievable scheme is as follows.
The achievable scheme uses transmission of random bits, interference cancelation, time sharing
and relaying of the other user’s data bits. The transmitters share a combination of random bits
and data bits through the cooperative links. To simplify the understanding of the achievable
scheme, first consider the α = 2 case. In this case, both the transmitters share m
2
random bits
along with C1 , C − m2 data bits. In the first time slot, transmitter 1 sends m random bits
(di and ei) on alternate levels in [1 : m]. In order to eliminate the interference caused by these
random bits at receiver 2, the data bits of transmitter 2 are precoded (xored) with these m
random bits and transmitted on the levels from [m + 1 : 2m] from transmitter 2. The random
bits are not canceled at receiver 1. Further, receiver 1 has no knowledge of these random bits.
Hence, it cannot decode the bits intended to receiver 2. Also, the data bits of transmitter 2
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received through the cooperative link are transmitted at the upper levels [n − C1 + 1 : n] from
transmitter 1. Again, in order to ensure secrecy at receiver 1, transmitter 2 sends the same data
bits at levels [m−C1+1 : m] along with the C1 data bits of transmitter 1, also received through
cooperation. This not only cancels the interference due to the bits sent on levels [n−C1+1 : n]
at receiver 1, but also enables transmitter 2 to relay the data bits of transmitter 1.
In the remaining upper levels [m + 1 : n − C1], transmitter 1 sends its own data bits xored
with random bits. Transmitter 2 transmits the same random bits on levels [1 : C1] to cancel the
random bits at receiver 1. In this way, transmitter 1 sends m− C1 data bits of its own and C1
data bits of transmitter 2, in the first time slot. Simultaneously, transmitter 2 is able to send
m data bits of its own and C1 data bits of transmitter 1. In the second time slot, the roles of
transmitters 1 and 2 are reversed.
In contrast to the achievable schemes for other interference regimes, transmitters exchange
both random bits and data bits through the cooperative links. However, as the capacity of the
cooperative links increases, it is required to exchange less number of random bits.
When α > 2, it is straightforward to extend the achievable scheme described above. Both the
transmitter exchanges m
2
random bits and C ′ , C − m
2
data bits. Out of C ′ data bits obtained
through cooperation, n−2m data bits are securely relayed using the levels [m+1 : n−m]. The
m random bits and the remaining C1 , C ′− n+2m data bits obtained through cooperation are
used in a similar manner as explained for the α = 2 case. The signal of transmitter 1 in the first
time slot is encoded as follows:
x1 =

0(n−m)×1
d1m×1
⊕

bcC1×1
a(m−C1)×1 ⊕ d2(m−C1)×1
0(n−m)×1
⊕

0m×1
b′
c
(n−2m)×1
0m×1
 , (76)
where d1 , [em/2, dm/2, . . . , e1, d1]T , bc , [bn, bn−1, . . . , bn−C1+1]T , a , [am−C1 , . . . , a2, a1]T ,
d2 , [dq, eq, . . . , d1, e1]
T if m − C1 is even, d2 , [eq+1, dq, eq, . . . , d1, e1]T if m − C1 is odd,
q , ⌊m−C1
2
⌋ and b′c , [bn−m, bn−m−1 . . . , bm+1]T .
The signal of transmitter 2 in the first time slot is encoded as follows:
x2 =

bm×1 ⊕ e2m×1
0(n−m)×1
⊕

0(n−m)×1
blC1×1 ⊕ acC1×1
e1(m−C1)×1
⊕

0m×1
a′
c
(n−2m)×1
0m×1
 , (77)
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where b , [bm, bm−1, . . . , b1]T , e2 , [em/2, dm/2, . . . , e1, d1]T , bl , [bn, bn−1, . . . , bn−C1+1]T ,
ac , [am, am−1, . . . , am−C1+1]
T
, e1 , [dq, eq, . . . , d1, e1]
T if m−C1 is even, e1 , [eq+1, dq, eq, . . . , d1, e1]T
if m− C1 is odd, q , ⌊m−C12 ⌋ and a′c , [an−m, an−m−1, . . . , am+1]T .
In the second time slot, the encoding for transmitters 1 and 2 is reversed. The proposed scheme
achieves the following secrecy rate:
Rs =
n
2
− m
4
+
C
2
. (78)
4) When (n−m
2
≤ C ≤ n) and m is even: In this case, both the transmitters share C data bits
and the achievable scheme uses interference cancelation. The signal of transmitter 1 is encoded
as follows:
x1 =

0(n−C+m)+×1
a(C−m)×1
⊕

0(n−C)+×1
bC×1
 , (79)
where a , [aC , aC−1, . . . , am+1]T and b , [bC , bC−1, . . . , b1]T .
The proposed scheme achieves the following secrecy rate:
Rs = C. (80)
5) When 0 < C ≤ m+1
2
and m is odd: The achievable scheme is same as that mentioned for
α ≥ 2 and even valued m case. The proposed scheme achieves the following secrecy rate:
Rs = min{2C,m}. (81)
6) When m+1
2
< C ≤ 2n−3m+1
2
and m is odd: In this case, the achievable scheme is same as
that mentioned for (m
2
< C ≤ n− 3m
2
) and even valued m case. The message of transmitter 1
is encoded as follows
x1 =

dum×1
0(n−2m)×1
dlm×1
⊕

0(n−m−C′)×1
bcC′×1
0m×1
 , (82)
where du = [em+1
2
, . . . , d1, e1]
T
, dl = [dm+1
2
, . . . , e1, d1]
T
, bc = [am+C′ , am+C′−1, . . . , am+1]
T and
C ′ = C − m+1
2
. The proposed scheme achieves the following secrecy rate
Rs = m+min
{
C − m+ 1
2
, n− 2m
}
. (83)
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7) When 2n−3m+1
2
< C ≤ n and m is odd: In this case, the achievable scheme is similar to
that described in F3. The proposed scheme differs in the way encoding is performed. To simplify
the understanding of the encoding scheme, it is explained for the α = 2 case. In the first time
slot, transmitter 1 sends Cuu1 =
⌈
C
2
⌉
data bits of transmitter 2 received through cooperation on
the upper levels [n− Cuu1 + 1 : n]. In order to ensure secrecy at receiver 1, transmitter 2 sends
the same data bits at levels [m−C lu2 +1 : m] along with the C lu2 = Cuu1 data bits of transmitter
1, also received through cooperation. In the remaining upper levels [m+1 : n−Cuu1 ], transmitter
1 sends Cul1 = (m − Cuu1 )+ its own data bits xored with random bits. Transmitter 2 sends the
same random bits on levels [1 : C ll2 ] (C ll2 = Cul1 ) to cancel the random bits at receiver 1. The
number of random cooperative bits used in such transmission is Cr1 =
⌈
Cul1
2
⌉
. Also, transmitter
1 relays C lu1 = (C −Cuu1 −Cr1)+ data bits of transmitter 2 received through cooperation on the
levels [m−C lu1 +1 : m]. As the links corresponding to these levels are not present to receiver 1,
these data bits remain secure. Transmitter 1 sends C ll1 = min{2Cr1 , (m−C lu1 )+)} of random bits
on the levels [1 : C ll1 ] to ensure secrecy for transmitter 2 data. Transmitter 2 sends its Cul2 = C ll1
data bits precoded with the same random bits transmitted on the levels [1 : C ll1 ], to eliminate
the random bits at receiver 2. The number of cooperative random bits used by transmitter 2 is
Cr2 = max
{⌈
Cll2
2
⌉
,
⌊
Cul2
2
⌋}
. Then. transmitter 2 can relay the remaining Cuu2 = (C−C lu2 −Cr2)+
cooperative data bits on the upper levels [n−Cuu2 +1 : n]. As these bits will cause interference
at receiver 2, transmitter 1 sends the same data bits on the levels [m − Cuu2 + 1 : m] to cancel
the interference at receiver 2. In the first time slot, the message of transmitter 1 is encoded as
follows.
x1 =

b′
uu
Cuu1 ×1
aul
Cul1 ×1
0(n−Cuu1 −C
ul
1 )×1
⊕

0(n−m)×1
b′
lu
Clu1 ×1
0(m−Clu1 −Cll1 )+×1
dCll1 ×1
⊕

0Cuu1 ×1
dul
Cul1 ×1
0(n−Cuu1 −C
ul
1 )×1
⊕

0m×1
bc(n−2m)×1
aluCuu2 ×1
0(m−Cuu2 )+×1
 ,
(84)
where b′uu = [bn, bn−1, . . . , bn−Cuu1 +1]
T
, b′
lu = [bm, bm−1, . . . , bm−Clu1 +1]
T
, aul = [aCul1 , aCul1 −1,
. . . , a1]
T
, dul = [dCr1 , eCr1 , . . . , d1, e1]
T if Cr1 is even, dul = [eCr1 , dCr1−1, eCr1−1, . . . , d1, e1]
T if
Cr1 is odd, alu = [an, an−1, . . . , an−Cuu2 +1]
T
, dll = [eCll1 , dCll1 , . . . , e1, d1]
T if C ll1 is even, dll =
[dCll1 , eCll1 −1, dCll1 −1 . . . , e1, d1]
T if C ll1 is odd and b′
c = [bn−m, bn−m−1, . . . , bm+1]
T
. The message
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of transmitter 2 is encoded as follows
x2 =

0uu
(m−Cul2 )×1
bul
Cul2 ×1
0(n−2m)×1
blu
Clu2 ×1
0(m−Clu2 )×1

⊕

a′
uu
Cuu2 ×1
0(m−Cuu2 )×1
ac(n−2m)×1
a′
lu
Clu2 ×1
0(m−Clu2 )×1

⊕

0(n−Cll2 )×1
ell
Cll2 ×1

⊕

0(m−Cul2 )×1
eul
Cul2 ×1
0(n−m)×1

, (85)
where bul = [bCul2 , bCul2 −1, . . . , b1]
T
, blu = [bn, bn−1, . . . , bn−Clu2 +1]
T
, a′
uu = [an, bn−1, . . . , bn−Cuu2 +1]
T
,
ac = [an−m, an−m−1, . . . , am+1]
T
, a′
lu = [am, am−1, . . . , am−Clu2 +1]
T
, ell = [dCll2
2
, eCll2
2
, . . . , d1, e1]
T
if C ll2 is even, ell = [e⌈Cll2
2
⌉, d⌈Cll
2
2
⌉
−1
, . . . , d1, e1]
T if C ll2 is odd, eul = [eCul2
2
, dCll
2
2
, . . . , e1, d1]
T if
Cul2 is even and ell = [d⌈Cul2
2
⌉, e⌈Cul2
2
⌉
−1
, . . . , e1, d1]
T if Cul2 is odd.
In the second time slot, the encoding scheme is reversed for transmitter 1 and 2. The proposed
scheme achieves the following secrecy rate
Rs = n− 2m+ 1
2
[
Cul1 + 2C
uu
1 + C
uu
2 + C
lu
1 + C
ul
2
]
. (86)
G. Proof of Theorem 6
Using Fano’s inequality, the rate of user 1 is upper bounded as
NR1
≤ I(W1;yN1 ) +NǫN ,
(a)
≤ h(yN1 )− h(yN1 |W1,xN1 ) +NǫN ,
(b)
≤ h(yN1 )− h(hcxN2 + zN1 |vN12,vN21,W1,xN1 ) +NǫN ,
(c)
= h(yN1 )− h(hcxN2 + zN1 |vN12,vN21) +NǫN ,
(d)
= h(yN1 )− h(hcxN2 + z˜N1 |vN12,vN21) +NǫN ,
or h(˜sN2 |vN12,vN21) ≤ h(yN1 )−NR1 +NǫN ,
where s˜N2 , hcxN2 + z˜N1 , (87)
where (a) and (b) follow by using the fact that the entropy cannot increase by additional
conditioning; (c) follows by using the relation in (3), and (d) is obtained using the fact that
the secrecy capacity region of an IC with confidential messages is invariant under any joint
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channel noise distribution P (z1, z2) that leads to the same marginal distributions P (z1) and
P (z2) [33]. Although this invariance property is stated for GIC in [33], it is not difficult to see
that this property holds for the GIC with limited-rate transmitter cooperation also.
Adopting similar steps as was used to obtain (87), the following bound on the conditional
entropy is obtained.
h(˜sN1 |vN12,vN21) ≤ h(yN2 )−NR2 +NǫN ,
where s˜N1 , hcxN1 + z˜N2 , (88)
The rate of user 1 can also be bounded as
NR1
≤ I(W1;yN1 ) +Nǫ,
(a)
≤ I(W1;yN1 )− I(W1;yN2 ) +Nǫ′,
(b)
≤ I(W1;yN1 ,yN2 )− I(W1;yN2 ) +Nǫ′,
= I(W1;y
N
1 |yN2 ) +Nǫ′,
= h(yN1 |yN2 )− h(yN1 |yN2 ,W1) +Nǫ′,
= h(yN1 ,y
N
2 )− h(yN2 )− h(yN1 |yN2 ,W1) +Nǫ′,
(c)
= h(yN1 ,y
N
2 , s˜
N
1 , s˜
N
2 )− h(˜sN1 , s˜N2 |yN1 ,yN2 )− h(yN2 )− h(yN1 |yN2 ,W1) +Nǫ′,
= h(˜sN1 , s˜
N
2 ) + h(y
N
1 ,y
N
2 |˜sN1 , s˜N2 )− h(˜sN1 , s˜N2 |yN1 ,yN2 )− h(yN2 )− h(yN1 |yN2 ,W1) +Nǫ′,
= I (˜sN1 , s˜
N
2 ;y
N
1 ,y
N
2 ) + h(y
N
1 ,y
N
2 |˜sN1 , s˜N2 )− h(yN2 )− h(yN1 |yN2 ,W1) +Nǫ′,
(d)
≤ I (˜sN1 , s˜N2 ;yN1 ,yN2 ,vN12,vN21) + h(yN1 ,yN2 |˜sN1 , s˜N2 )− h(yN2 )− h(yN1 |yN2 ,W1) +Nǫ′,
≤ H(vN12,vN21) + I (˜sN1 , s˜N2 ;yN1 ,yN2 |vN12,vN21) + h(yN1 ,yN2 |˜sN1 , s˜N2 )− h(yN2 )− h(yN1 |yN2 ,W1) +Nǫ′,
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≤ H(vN12) +H(vN21) + h(˜sN1 , s˜N2 |vN12,vN21)− h(˜sN1 , s˜N2 |yN1 ,yN2 ,vN12,vN21) + h(yN1 ,yN2 |˜sN1 , s˜N2 )
− h(yN2 )− h(yN1 |yN2 ,W1) +Nǫ′,
(e)
≤ H(vN12) +H(vN21) + h(˜sN1 |vN12,vN21) + h(˜sN2 |vN12,vN21)− h(˜sN1 , s˜N2 |yN1 ,yN2 ,vN12,vN21,xN1 ,xN2 )
+ h(yN1 ,y
N
2 |˜sN1 , s˜N2 )− h(yN2 )− h(yN1 |yN2 ,W1,xN1 ,xN2 ) +Nǫ′,
= H(vN12) +H(v
N
21) + h(˜s
N
1 |vN12,vN21) + h(˜sN2 |vN12,vN21)− h(z˜N1 , z˜N2 ) + h(yN1 ,yN2 |˜sN1 , s˜N2 )
− h(yN2 )− h(zN1 ) +Nǫ′, (89)
where (a) is obtained using the secrecy constraint at receiver 2; (b) is due to the genie pro-
viding yN2 to receiver 1; (c) is obtained using the relation h(yN1 ,yN2 , s˜N1 , s˜N2 ) = h(yN1 ,yN2 ) +
h(˜sN1 , s˜
N
2 |yN1 ,yN2 ); (d) is obtained using chain rule for mutual information, and (e) is obtained
using the fact that removing conditioning cannot decrease the entropy and conditioning cannot
increase the entropy.
Using (87) and (88), (89) becomes
N [2R1 +R2] ≤ H(vN12) +H(vN21) + h(yN1 ) + h(yN1 ,yN2 |˜sN1 , s˜N2 )− h(z˜N1 )− h(z˜N2 )− h(zN1 ) +Nǫ′′,
or R ≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
1
3
[
2CG + 0.5 log
(
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR INR
)
+ 0.5 log det
(
Σy¯|s¯
)]
.
(90)
In the above equation, ρ, det(·) and Σy¯|s¯ are as defined in the statement of the theorem. The
second term in (90) is obtained using the fact that differential entropy is maximized by the
Gaussian distribution for a given power constraint. Hence, the following holds.
h(y1) ≤ 0.5 log
(
2πe
(
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR INR
))
, (91)
where SNR and INR are as defined in the statement of the theorem. The last term in (90) is
obtained as follows.
h(y1,y2 |˜s1, s˜2) ≤ 0.5 log det
(
2πeΣy¯|s¯
)
, (92)
where Σy¯|s¯ , Σy¯ − Σy¯,s¯Σ−1s¯ ΣTy¯,s¯, Σy¯ , E[y¯y¯T ], Σy¯,s¯ , E[y¯s¯T ], Σs¯ , E[s¯s¯T ], y¯ , [y1 y2]T ,
and s¯ , [˜s1 s˜2]T . The evaluation of these terms are given in the statement of the theorem. This
completes the proof.
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H. Proof of Theorem 7
Using Fano’s inequality, the rate of user 1 is upper bounded as
NR1
≤ I(W1;yN1 ) +NǫN ,
(a)
≤ I(W1;yN1 ,xN2 ) +NǫN ,
= I(W1;x
N
2 ) + I(W1;y
N
1 |xN2 ) +NǫN ,
= I(W1;x
N
2 ) + h(s
′N
1 |xN2 )− h(s′N1 |xN2 ,W1) +NǫN , where s′N1 , hdxN1 + zN1 ,
= I(W1;x
N
2 ) + I(W1; s
′N
1 |xN2 ) +NǫN ,
(b)
= I(W1;x
N
2 , s
′N
1 ) +NǫN ,
(c)
≤ I(W1; s′N1 )− I(W1;yN2 ) + I(W1;xN2 |s′N1 ) +Nǫ′N ,
(d)
≤ I(W1; s′N1 ,yN2 )− I(W1;yN2 ) + I(W1;xN2 |s′N1 ) +Nǫ′N ,
= I(W1; s
′N
1 |yN2 ) + I(W1;xN2 |s′N1 ) +Nǫ′N ,
(e)
≤ I(W1; s′N1 |yN2 ) + I(W1;xN2 ,vN12,vN21|s′N1 ) +Nǫ′N ,
= I(W1; s
′N
1 |yN2 ) + I(W1;vN12,vN21|s′N1 ) + I(W1;xN2 |s′N1 ,vN12,vN21) +Nǫ′N ,
≤ I(W1; s′N1 |yN2 ) +H(vN12,vN21|s′N1 ) + h(xN2 |s′N1 ,vN12,vN21)
− h(xN2 |s′N1 ,vN12,vN21,W1) +Nǫ′N ,
(f)
≤ h(s′N1 |yN2 )− h(s′N1 |yN2 ,W1) +H(vN12,vN21) +Nǫ′N ,
or R1 ≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
[
2CG + 0.5 logΣs′|y2
]
, (93)
where (a) is due to the genie providing xN2 to receiver 1; (b) is obtained using chain rule for
mutual information; (c) is obtained using secrecy constraint at receiver 2; (d) is due to the genie
providing yN2 as side information to receiver 1, where xN2 is eliminated, (e) is obtained using the
relation I(W1;xN2 ,vN12,vN21|s′N1 ) = I(W1;xN2 |s′N1 ) + I(W1;vN12,vN21|s′N1 ,xN2 ) and (f) is obtained
using the relation in (3) and the fact that removing conditioning does not decrease the entropy.
The last inequality is obtained using the fact that the differential entropy is maximized by the
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Gaussian distribution for a given power constraint. The term Σs′|y2 is evaluated as follows.
Σs′|y2 = E[s
′2
1]− E[s′y2]2E[y22]−1
= 1 +
SNR + SNR2(1− ρ2)
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR INR
. (94)
This completes the proof.
I. Proof of Theorem 8
Using Fano’s inequality, the rate of user 1 is upper bounded as
NR1 ≤ I(W1;yN1 ) +NǫN ,
(a)
≤ I(W1;yN1 )− I(W1;yN2 ) +Nǫ′N ,
(b)
≤ I(W1;yN1 ,yN2 )− I(W1;yN2 ) +Nǫ′N ,
= I(W1;y
N
1 |yN2 )− I(W1;yN2 ) +Nǫ′N ,
≤ h(yN1 |yN2 )− h(zN1 ) +Nǫ′N ,
or R1 ≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
0.5 logΣy1|y2, (95)
where Σy1|y2 is obtained as given below.
Σy1|y2 = E[y
2
1]− E[y1y2]2E[y22]−1,
= 1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR INR− (2
√
SNR INR + ρ(SNR + INR))2
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR INR
. (96)
Substituting the value of Σy1|y2 from (96) in (95), results in (22) and this completes the proof.
J. Proof of Theorem 9
The proof involves analyzing the error probability at the encoder and decoder along with
equivocation computation. One of the novelties in obtaining the achievable scheme lies in the
choice of the cooperative private auxiliary codewords u1, and u2 so that the codeword carrying
the cooperative private part of the message (wcpi) is canceled at the unintended receiver. This
simultaneously eliminates interference and ensures secrecy of the cooperate private message.
For ensuring secrecy of the non-cooperative private message, it is required to show that the
weak secrecy constraint is satisfied at the receiver j, i.e., H(Wpi|yNj ) ≥ N [Rpi − ǫs]. In the
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equivocation computation, the main novelty lies in choosing the value of the rate sacrificed in
confusing the unintended receiver (R′pi) and rate of the dummy message (Rdi) so that the weak
secrecy constraint is satisfied.
1) Analysis of the probability of error: In the following, the probability of error is analyzed
at the encoder and decoder.
Encoding error: For the Marton’s coding scheme to succeed, the transmitter 1 and 2 can find
at least one jointly typical sequence pair (uN1 ,uN2 ) provided following condition is satisfied.
Rcp1 ≤ R˜cp1, Rcp2 ≤ R˜cp2,
Rcp1 ≤ C,Rcp2 ≤ C,
R˜cp1 −Rcp1 + R˜cp2 − Rcp2 ≥ I(u1;u2). (97)
When u1 and u2 are chosen independent of each other, then I(u1;u2) = 0. Given Rcp1 ≤ R˜cp1
and Rcp2 ≤ R˜cp2, the last condition in (97) becomes redundant.
Decoding error: Define the following event
Eijk =
{(
yN1 ,x
N
p1(i, j),u
N
1 (k)
) ∈ TNǫ } . (98)
Without loss of generality, assume that transmitter 1 and 2 sends xN1 (1, 1, 1, 1) and xN2 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
with (w˜cp1, w˜cp2) = (1, 1), respectively. An error occurs if the transmitted and received codewords
are not jointly typical or a wrong codeword is jointly typical with the received codewords. Then
by the union of events bounds
λ(n)e = P
(
Ec111
⋃
∪i 6=1,j 6=1,k 6=1Eijk
)
≤ P (Ec111) + P (∪i 6=1,j 6=1,k 6=1Eijk). (99)
From the joint AEP [35], P (Ec111)→ 0 as N →∞. When i 6= 1, j 6= 1, and k = 1, then
λij1 =
∑
i 6=1,j 6=1
P (Eij1) ≤ 2N[Rp1+R′p1]
∑
(yN1 ,x
N
p1,u
N
1 )∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1)P (u
N
1 )P (y
N
1 |uN1 ),
≤ 2N[Rp1+R′p1−I(xp1;y1|u1)+4ǫ]. (100)
Hence, λij1 → 0 as N →∞, if
Rp1 +R
′
p1 ≤ I(xp1;y1|u1). (101)
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When the above condition is satisfied, also, the probability of error λ1j1 and λi11 goes to zero
as N →∞. When k 6= 1 and (i, j) = (1, 1), then
λ11k =
∑
k 6=1
P (E11k) ≤ 2NR˜cp1
∑
(yN1 ,x
N
p1,u
N
1 )∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1)P (u
N
1 )P (y
N
1 |xNp1),
≤ 2N[R˜cp1−I(u1;y1|xp1)+4ǫ]. (102)
Hence, λ11k → 0 as N →∞, if
R˜cp1 ≤ I(u1;y1|xp1). (103)
When i 6= 1, j 6= 1, and k 6= 1, then
λijk =
∑
i 6=1,j 6=1,k 6=1
P (Eijk) ≤ 2N[R˜cp1+Rp1+R′p1]
∑
(yN1 ,x
N
p1,u
N
1 )∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1)P (u
N
1 )P (y
N
1 ),
≤ 2N[R˜cp1+Rp1+R′p1−I(u1,xp1;y1)+4ǫ]. (104)
Hence, λijk → 0 as N →∞, if
R˜cp1 +Rp1 +R
′
p1 ≤ I(u1,xp1;y1). (105)
The above condition also ensures that λi1k and λ1jk go to zero as N →∞. Hence, λ(n)e in (99)
goes to 0 as N →∞, when the conditions in (101), (103) and (105) are satisfied.
Now, using the Fourier-Motzkin procedure [36], the achievable rate in Theorem 9 is obtained.
The choice of R′p1 is discussed in Section J2.
Choice of u1 and u2
The cooperative private auxiliary codewords ui (i = 1, 2), are chosen such that the interference
caused by the codeword uj at receiver i (i 6= j) is nulled out completely. This not only eliminates
the interference caused by the cooperative private part, but also ensures secrecy of the cooperative
private message. Choose xcp, u1 and u2 to be jointly Gaussian, and such that
xcp = w1zv1z +w2zv2z ,
u1 = [hd hc] v1zw1z, and u2 = [hc hd] v2zw2z, (106)
where v1z , [hd − hc]T , v2z , [−hc hd]T and w1z and w2z are independent Gaussian
with variance σ21z and σ22z , respectively. Recall that wiz (i = 1, 2) is the codeword representing
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the cooperative private message wcpi of transmitter i. The choice of σ21z and σ22z is discussed in
the proof of Corollary 2 (Appendix L).
Remark: For the extension to asymmetric setting, the choice of the auxiliary codewords for
the cooperative private message needs to be modified as follows:
u1 = [h11 h12] v1zw1z = (h11h22 − h12h21)w1z,
and u2 = [h21 h22] v2zw2z = (h11h22 − h12h21)w2z, (107)
where v1z , [h22 − h21]T , v2z , [−h12 h11]T , w1z and w2z are independent Gaussian
distributed with variance σ21z and σ22z, respectively. The rest of the proof follows along similar
lines as explained below.
2) Equivocation computation: The equivocation at the receiver 2 is bounded as follows.
H(W1|yN2 ) = H(Wp1,Wcp1|yN2 ),
= H(Wp1|yN2 ) +H(Wcp1|yN2 ,Wp1). (108)
First consider the term H(Wcp1|yN2 ,Wp1). The output at the receiver 2 is
y2 = u2 + hdxd2 + hcxp1 + z2. (109)
As u1 and u2 are chosen to be independent of each other, i.e., I(u1;u2) = 0, and wcp1 is chosen
independent of wp1, the following holds:
H(Wcp1|yN2 ,Wp1) = H(Wcp1). (110)
Hence, it is only required to show the following:
H(Wp1|yN2 ) ≥ N [Rp1 − ǫs] . (111)
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Consider the following:
H(Wp1|yN2 ) ≥ H(Wp1|yN2 ,xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2),
(a)
= H(Wp1,y
N
2 |xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2)−H(yN2 |xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2),
(b)
= H(Wp1,y
N
2 ,x
N
p1,x
N
d2|xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2)−H(xNp1,xNd2|yN2 ,uN2 ,xNp2,Wp1,W ′′d2)
−H(yN2 |xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2),
= H(xNp1,x
N
d2|xNp2,W ′′d2) +H(Wp1,yN2 |xNp1,xNd2,uN2 ,xNp2,W ′′d2)
−H(xNp1,xNd2|yN2 ,xNp2,Wp1,W ′′d2)−H(yN2 |xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2),
≥ H(xNp1) +H(xNd2|W ′′d2) +H(yN2 |xNp1,xNd2,uN2 ,xNp2,W ′′d2)H(yN2 |xNp2,uN2 )
−H(xNp1,xNd2|yN2 ,uN2 ,xNp2,Wp1,W ′′d2),
(c)
= H(xNp1) +H(x
N
d2|W ′′d2) +H(yN2 |xNp1,xNd2,uN2 ,xNp2)−H(yN2 |xNp2,uN2 )
−H(xNp1,xNd2|yN2 ,uN2 ,xNp2,Wp1,W ′′d2),
= N
[
Rp1 +R
′
p1 +R
′
d2
]− I(xNp1,xNd2;yN2 |uN2 ,xNp2)
−H(xNp1,xNd2|yN2 ,uN2 ,xNp2,Wp1,W ′′d2), (112)
where (a) and (b) are obtained using the relations in (113) and (114), respectively; and (c) is
obtained using the fact that W ′′d2 → (xNp1,xNd2,xNp2,uN2 ) → yN2 forms a Markov chain. This can
be shown with the help of a functional dependency graph [37].
H(Wp1,y
N
2 |xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2) = H(yN2 |xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2) +H(Wp1|yN2 ,xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2), (113)
H(Wp1,y
N
2 ,x
N
p1,x
N
d2|xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2) = H(Wp1,yN2 |xNp2,uN2 ,W ′′d2)
+H(xNp1,x
N
d2|yN2 ,xNp2,uN2 ,Wp1,W ′′d2). (114)
Using Lemma 1 in Appendix K, it can be shown that
I(xNp1,x
N
d2;y
N
2 |uN2 ,xNp2) ≤ NI(xp1,xd2;y2|u2,xp2) +Nǫ′. (115)
Thus the remaining key step in showing that the condition in (111) is satisfied is to bound
the last term in (112). To bound this term, consider the joint decoding of W ′p1 and W ′d2 at
receiver 2 assuming that a genie has given Wp1 and W ′′d2 as side information to receiver 2. For
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a given Wp1 = wp1 and W ′′d2 = w′′d2, assume that w′p1 and w′d2 are sent by transmitters 1 and 2,
respectively and receiver 2 knows the sequence yN2 = yN2 and uN2 = uN2 . For a given Wp1 = wp1
and W ′′d2 = w′′d2, receiver 2 declares that j and l was sent if (xNp1(wp1, j),xNd2(l, w′′d2),yN2 ) is
jointly typical and such (j, l) exists and is unique. Otherwise, an error is declared. Now, define
the following event
E1jl =
{
(xNp1(wp1, j),x
N
d2(l, w
′′
d2),y
N
2 ) ∈ TNǫ (Pxp1,xd2,y2|u2,xp2)
}
, (116)
where TNǫ (PXp1Xd2Y2|U2Xp2) denotes, for given typical sequences u2 and xp2, the set of jointly
typical sequences y1,xp1, and u1 with respect to PXp1Xd2Y2|U2Xp2 . Without loss of generality,
assume that xNp1(wp1, 1) and xNd2(1, w′′d2) were sent. Then, by the union of events bound, the
following is obtained:
PNe1 = P
(
E1
c
11
⋃
∪j 6=1,l 6=1E1jl
)
,
≤ P (E1c11) + 2NR
′
p12−N [I(xp1;y2|xd2,u2,xp2)−3ǫ] + 2NR
′
d22−N [I(xd2;y2|xp1,u2,xp2)−3ǫ]
+ 2N(R
′
p1+R
′
d2)2−N [I(xp1,xd2;y2|u2,xp2)−3ǫ]. (117)
Hence, the probability of error PNe1 is arbitrarily small for large N , provided the following
conditions are satisfied.
R′P1 ≤ I(xp1;y2|xd2,u2,xp2),
R′d2 ≤ I(xd2;y2|xp1,u2,xp2),
R′p1 +R
′
d2 ≤ I(xp1,xd2;y2|u2,xp2). (118)
When the conditions in (118) are satisfied and for sufficiently large N , the following bound is
obtained using Fano’s inequality:
1
N
H(xNp1,x
N
d2|yN1 ,uN2 ,xNp2,Wp1 = wp1,W ′′d2 = w′′d2) ≤
1
N
[1 + PNe1 log 2
N [R′p1+R
′
d2]] ≤ δ1. (119)
Using the above, the last term in (112) is bounded as follows:
H(xNp1,x
N
d2|yN2 ,uN2 ,xNp2,Wp1,W ′′d2)
=
∑
wp1,w
′′
d2
P (wp1, w
′′
d2)H(x
N
p1,x
N
d2|yN2 ,uN2 ,xNp2,Wp1 = wp1,W ′′d2 = w′′d2),
≤ Nδ1. (120)
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Using (115) and (120), (112) becomes
H(Wp1|yN2 ) ≥ N
[
Rp1 +R
′
p1 +R
′
d2 − I(xp1,xd2;y2|u2,xp2)− ǫ1
]
, (121)
where ǫ1 = ǫ′ + δ1. By choosing R′p1 +R′d2 = I(xp1,xd2;y2|u2,xp2)− ǫ11, (121) becomes
H(Wp1|yN2 ) ≥ N [Rp1 − ǫs] , where ǫs = ǫ1 + ǫ11. (122)
Hence, by choosing R′p1 = I(xp1;y2|xp2,u2)−ǫ′11 and R′d2 = I(xd2;y2|xp1,xp2,u2)−ǫ′′11, secrecy
is ensured for the non-cooperative private message of transmitter 1, and also, the achievability
condition in (118) is satisfied.
For receiver 1, also, it is only required to show that the non-cooperative private message of
transmitter 2 remains secure. To bound the equivocation at receiver 1, consider the following:
H(Wp2|yN1 ) ≥ H(Wp2|yN1 ,xNp1,uN1 ,W ′d2). (123)
Then, by following similar steps as used in case of receiver 2, it can be shown that the choice
of R′p2 = I(xp2;y1|xp1,u1) − ǫ′2 and R′′d2 = I(xd2;y1|xp1,xp2,u1) − ǫ′′2 , ensures secrecy of the
non-cooperative private message of transmitter 2. This completes the proof.
The following lemma is useful in bounding the mutual information in the proof of Theorem 9.
K. A useful Lemma
Lemma 1:
I(xNp1,x
N
d2;y
N
2 |xNp2,uN2 ) ≤ N [I(xp1,xd2;y2|xp2,u2) + ǫ3] , (124)
where ǫ3 is small for sufficiently large N .
Proof: Let T (N)ǫ (PXp1,Xp2,Xd2,U2,Y2) denote the set of typical sequences (xNp1,xNp2,xNd2,uN2 ,yN2 )
with respect to P (xp1, xp2, xd2, u2, y2). Define the following indicator random variable.
ψ(xNp1,x
N
p2,x
N
d2,u
N
2 ,y
N
2 ) =
 1 (xNp1,xNp2,xNd2,uN2 ,yN2 ) /∈ TNǫ (PXp1,Xp2,Xd2,U2,Y2)0 otherwise
(125)
Now, I(xNp1,xNd2;yN2 |xNp2,uN2 ) is bounded as follows.
I(xNp1,x
N
d2;y
N
2 |xNp2,uN2 ) ≤ I(xNp1,xNd2, ψ;yN2 |xNp2,uN2 ),
= I(ψ;yN2 |xNp2,uN2 ) + I(xNp1,xNd2;yN2 |xNp2,uN2 , ψ). (126)
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Consider the first term in (126).
I(ψ;yN2 |xNp2,uN2 ) ≤ H(ψ) ≤ 1. (127)
Consider the second term in (126).
I(xNp1,x
N
d2;y
N
2 |xNp2,uN2 , ψ) =
1∑
j=0
P (ψ = j)I(xNp1,x
N
d2;y
N
2 |xNp2,uN2 , ψ = j). (128)
When j = 1, then (xNp1,xNp2,xNd2,uN2 ,yN2 ) /∈ T (N)ǫ and the following bound is obtained.
P (ψ = 1)I(xNp1,x
N
d2;y
N
2 |xNp2,uN2 , ψ = 1) ≤ P
{
(xNp1,x
N
p2,x
N
d2,u
N
2 ,y
N
2 ) /∈ T (N)ǫ
}
H(yN2 ),
≤ Nǫ3 log |Y2|. (129)
When j = 0, then (xNp1,xNp2,xNd2,uN2 ,yN2 ) ∈ T (N)ǫ and the following bound is obtained.
P (ψ = 0)I(xNp1,x
N
d2;y
N
2 |xNp2,uN2 , ψ = 0)
≤ I(xNp1,xNd2;yN2 |xNp2,uN2 , ψ = 0),
≤
∑
(xNp1,x
N
p2,x
N
d2,u
N
2 ,y
N
2 )∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1,x
N
p2,x
N
d2,u
N
2 ,y
N
2 )
[
logP (xNp1,x
N
d2,y
N
2 |xNp2,uN2 )
− logP (yN2 |xNp2,uN2 )− logP (xNp1,xNd2|xNp2,uN2 )
]
,
≤ N [H(y2|xp2,u2) +H(xp1,xd2|xp2,u2)−H(xp1,xd2,y2|xp2,u2) + 3ǫ3] ,
= N [I(xp1;y2|xp2,u2) + 3ǫ2] . (130)
From (127)-(130), (126) is bounded as follows.
I(xNp1;y
N
2 |xNp2,uN2 ) ≤ NI(xp1;y2|xp2,u2) +Nǫ′3, (131)
where ǫ′3 = ǫ′3 log |Y2|+ 3ǫ2 + 1N .
L. Proof of Corollary 2
In the first and second time slots, transmitters 1 and 2 send the following encoded messages:
x1(1) = xcp[1](1) + xp1(1), and x2(1) = xcp[2](1) + xp2(1) + xd2(1),
x1(2) = xcp[1](2) + xp1(2) + xd1(2), and x2(2) = xcp[2](2) + xp2(2), (132)
where xcp is as defined in (106) and xcp[i](j) corresponds to the ith element of the vector at
the j th time slot. In the following, the achievable secrecy rate and power allocation for different
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messages are discussed in the case of the first time slot. Hence, for simplicity, the time index
is omitted. The mutual information terms given in Theorem 9 are evaluated as follows. From
Theorem 9, R′p1 and R′p2 are set as 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2cPp1
1+h2
d
Pd2
)
and 0.5 log(1 + h
2
cPp2
1+h2cPd2
), respectively.
The first equation in (33) becomes
R1 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 +
σ2u + h
2
dPp1
1 + h2cPd2 + h
2
cPp2
)
− R′p1. (133)
The second equation in (33) becomes
R1 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2dPp1
1 + h2cPd2 + h
2
cPp2
)
+min
{
CG, 0.5 log
(
1 +
σ2u
1 + h2cPd2 + h
2
cPp2
)}
− R′p1.
(134)
The achievable rate for user 2 becomes
R2 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 +
σ2u + h
2
dPp2
1 + h2dPd2 + h
2
cPp1
)
−R′p2, (135)
R2 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2dPp2
1 + h2dPd2 + h
2
cPp1
)
+min
{
CG, 0.5 log
(
1 +
σ2u
1 + h2dPd2 + h
2
cPp1
)}
− R′p2.
(136)
The encoded message at transmitters 1 and 2 are
x1 = hdw1z − hcw2z + xp1, and
x2 = hdw2z − hcw1z + xp2 + xd2. (137)
To simplify the power allocation, the variance of w1z and w2z are chosen to be the same, i.e,
σ21z = σ
2
2z = σ
2
z . In order to satisfy the power constraint at the transmitters, the following
conditions need to be satisfied.
(h2d + h
2
c)σ
2
z + Pp1≤P1 and (h2d + h2c)σ2z + Pp2 + Pd2≤P2, (138)
where Pi = βiP (i = 1, 2), 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1 and P is the maximum power available at either
transmitter. The power for the non-cooperative private message, cooperative private message and
dummy message are chosen as follows:
σ2z =
θ1
θ1 + θ2
P1
h2d + h
2
c
, Pp1 =
θ2
θ1 + θ2
P1,
Pp2 =
η1
η1 + η2
P ′, Pd2 =
η2
η1 + η2
P ′, and
P ′ = (P2 − (h2d + h2c)σ2z)+. (139)
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where (θi, ηi) ∈ [0, 1]. The parameters θi and ηi act as power splitting parameters for transmitters
1 and 2, respectively. The parameter βi acts as a power control parameter. Hence, θi, ηi and βi
are chosen such that the rates in (133)-(136) are maximized, and the minimum of (133) and
(134) gives the achievable secrecy rate for transmitter 1 i.e., R∗1(1); and the minimum of (135)
and (136) give the achievable secrecy rate for the transmitter 2 i.e., R∗2(1). This completes the
proof.
M. Proof of Theorem 10
In contrast to the achievable scheme for the weak/moderate interference regime, the dummy
message sent by one of the users i is required to be decodable at the receiver j (j 6= i). Intuitively,
since the cross links are stronger than the direct links, stochastic encoding alone is not sufficient
to ensure secrecy of the non-cooperative private message. Hence, the dummy message sent by
transmitter i acts as a self-jamming signal, preventing receiver i from decoding the message from
the other transmitter j 6= i. At the same time, ensuring that the dummy message is decodable at
receiver j enables receiver j to cancel the interference caused by the dummy message, allowing
it to decode its own message. Thus, although the cross-links are strong, receiver i is unable to
decode the message from transmitter j because of the jamming signal; and this helps user j
achieve a better rate. In the next time slot, user i can achieve a better rate by exchanging the
roles of users i and j. The proof involves analyzing the error probability at the encoder and the
decoder along with equivocation computation. The conditions for the encoding error to go to
zero and the choice of u1 and u2 remain the same as in the proof of Theorem 9. The details
of the probability of error analysis are as follows. The conditions for encoding error to go to
zero and the choice of u1 and u2 remains same as in the proof of Theorem 9. Hence, in the
following, error at the decoder is analyzed.
Decoding error: Define the following event
Eijkl =
{(
yN1 ,x
N
p1(i, j),u
N
1 (k),x
N
d2(l)
) ∈ TNǫ } . (140)
Without loss of generality, assume that transmitter 1 and 2 sends xN1 (1, 1, 1, 1) and xN2 (1, 1, 1, 1)
with (w˜cp1, w˜cp2) = (1, 1), respectively. An error occurs if the transmitted and received codewords
are not jointly typical or a wrong codeword is jointly typical with the received codewords. Then
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by the union of events bounds
λ(n)e = P
(
Ec1111
⋃
∪i 6=1,j 6=1,k 6=1,l 6=1Eijkl
)
≤ P (Ec1111) + P (∪i 6=1,j 6=1,k 6=1,l 6=1Eijkl). (141)
From the joint AEP [35], P (Ec1111)→ 0 as N →∞.
When i 6= 1, j 6= 1, and (k, l) = (1, 1), then
λij11 =
∑
i 6=1,j 6=1
P (Eij11),
≤ 2N[Rp1+R′p1]
∑
(yN1 ,x
N
p1,u
N
1 ,x
N
d2)∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1)P (u
N
1 )P (x
N
d2)P (y
N
1 |uN1 ,xNd2),
≤ 2N[Rp1+R′p1−I(xp1;y1|u1,xd2)+5ǫ]. (142)
Hence, λij11 → 0 as N →∞, if
Rp1 +R
′
p1 ≤ I(xp1;y1|u1,xd2). (143)
Hence, if the condition in (143) is satisfied, then the probability of error λi111 and λ1j11, also
goes to zero. When k 6= 1 and (i, j, l) = (1, 1, 1), then
λ11k1 =
∑
k 6=1
P (E11k1),
≤ 2NR˜cp1
∑
(yN1 ,x
N
p1,u
N
1 ,x
N
d2)∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1)P (u
N
1 )P (x
N
d2)P (y
N
1 |xNp1,xNd2),
≤ 2N[R˜cp1−I(u1;y1|xp1,xd2)+5ǫ]. (144)
Hence, λ11k1 → 0 as N →∞, if
R˜cp1 ≤ I(u1;y1|xp1,xd2). (145)
When l 6= 1 and (i, j, k) = (1, 1, 1), then
λ111l =
∑
l 6=1
P (E111l),
≤ 2NRd2
∑
(yN1 ,x
N
p1,u
N
1 ,x
N
d2)∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1)P (u
N
1 )P (x
N
d2)P (y
N
1 |xNp1,uN1 ),
≤ 2N [Rd2−I(xd2;y1|xp1,u1)+5ǫ]. (146)
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Hence, λ111l → 0 as N →∞, if
Rd2 ≤ I(xd2;y1|xp1,u1). (147)
When i 6= 1, j 6= 1, k 6= 1, and l = 1, then
λijk1 =
∑
i 6=1,j 6=1,k 6=1
P (Eijk1),
≤ 2N[R˜cp1+Rp1+R′p1]
∑
(yN1 ,x
N
p1,u
N
1 ,x
N
d2)∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1)P (u
N
1 )P (x
N
d2)P (y
N
1 |xNd2),
≤ 2N[R˜cp1+Rp1+R′p1−I(u1,xp1;y1|xd2)+5ǫ]. (148)
Hence, λijk1 → 0 as N →∞, if
R˜cp1 +Rp1 +R
′
p1 ≤ I(u1,xp1;y1|xd2). (149)
Hence, if the condition in (149) is satisfied, then the probability of error λi1k1 and λ1jk1, also
goes to zero. When k 6= 1, l 6= 1, and (i, j) = (1, 1), then
λ11kl =
∑
k 6=1,l 6=1
P (E11kl),
≤ 2N[R˜cp1+Rd2]
∑
(yN1 ,x
N
p1,u
N
1 ,x
N
d2)∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1)P (u
N
1 )P (x
N
d2)P (y
N
1 |xNp1),
≤ 2N[R˜cp1+Rd2−I(u1,xd2;y1|xp1)+5ǫ]. (150)
Hence, λ11kl → 0 as N →∞, if
R˜cp1 +Rd2 ≤ I(u1,xd2;y1|xp1). (151)
When i 6= 1, j 6= 1, l 6= 1, and k = 1, then
λij1l =
∑
i 6=1,j 6=1,l 6=1
P (Eij1l),
≤ 2N[Rp1+R′p1+Rd2]
∑
(yN1 ,x
N
p1,u
N
1 ,x
N
d2)∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1)P (u
N
1 )P (x
N
d2)P (y
N
1 |uN1 ),
≤ 2N[Rp1+R′p1+Rd2−I(xp1,xd2;y1|u1)+5ǫ]. (152)
Hence, λij1l → 0 as N →∞, if
Rp1 +R
′
p1 +Rd2 ≤ I(xp1,xd2;y1|u1). (153)
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Hence, if the condition in (153) is satisfied, then the probability of error λi11l and λ1j1l, also
goes to zero.
When i 6= 1, j 6= 1, k 6= 1, and l 6= 1, then
λ1jkl =
∑
i 6=1,j 6=1,k 6=1,l 6=1
P (Eijkl),
≤ 2N[Rp1+R′p1+R˜cp1+Rd2]
∑
(yN1 ,x
N
p1,u
N
1 ,x
N
d2)∈T
(N)
ǫ
P (xNp1)P (u
N
1 )P (x
N
d2)P (y
N
1 ),
≤ 2N[Rp1+R′p1+R˜cp1+Rd2−I(u1,xp1,xd2;y1)+5ǫ]. (154)
Hence, λijkl → 0 as N →∞, if
Rp1 + R
′
p1 + R˜cp1 +Rd2 ≤ I(u1,xp1,xd2;y1). (155)
Hence, if the condition in (155) is satisfied, then the probability of error in λi1kl and λ1jkl, also
goes to zero.
In a similar way, it can be shown that the probability of decoding error at receiver 2 goes to
zero if following condition is satisfied.
R˜cp2 ≤ I(u2;y2). (156)
Hence, the encoding and decoding error go to 0 as N →∞, if (143), (145), (147), (149), (151),
(153) and (155) and (156). Then, by applying Fourier-Motzkin procedure [36] to these equations
and the conditions for encoding error, the achievable rate in Theorem 10 can be obtained.
1) Equivocation computation: The equivocation at receiver 2 is bounded as follows. As the
non-intended cooperative private message is canceled completely at receiver 2, it suffices to show
the following, as mentioned in Appendix J2.
H(Wp1|yN2 ) ≥ N [Rp1 − ǫs] . (157)
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Consider the following:
H(Wp1|yN2 ) ≥ H(Wp1|yN2 ,uN2 ),
= H(Wp1,y
N
2 |uN2 )−H(yN2 |uN2 ),
(a)
= H(Wp1,y
N
2 ,x
N
p1,x
N
d2|uN2 )−H(xNp1,xNd2|Wp1,yN2 ,uN2 )−H(yN2 |uN2 ),
= H(xNp1,x
N
d2|uN2 ) +H(Wp1,yN2 |xNp1,xNd2,uN2 )−H(yN2 |uN2 )
−H(xNp1,xNd2|Wp1,yN2 ,uN2 ),
≥ H(xNp1,xNd2|uN2 ) +H(yN2 |xNp1,xNd2,uN2 )−H(yN2 |uN2 )
−H(xNp1,xNd2|Wp1,yN2 ,uN2 ),
= Rp1 +R
′
p1 +Rd2 − I(xNp1,xNd2;yN2 |uN2 )−H(xNp1,xNd2|Wp1,yN2 ,uN2 ), (158)
where (a) is obtained using the relation: H(Wp1,yN2 ,xNp1,xNd2|uN2 ) = H(Wp1,yN2 |uN2 )+
H(xNp1,x
N
d2|Wp1,yN2 ,uN2 ). The second term in (158) is upper bounded as follows.
I(xNp1,x
N
d2;y
N
2 |uN2 ) ≤ NI(xp1,xd2;y2|u2) +Nǫ′. (159)
The above bound can be obtained by using similar steps as used in the proof of Lemma 1 in
Appendix K.
To bound the last term in (158), consider the joint decoding of W ′p1 and Wd2, assuming
that the receiver 2 is given Wp1 and uN2 as side information. By following similar steps as in
Appendix J2, it is possible to show that the probability of error is arbitrarily small for large N ,
provided the following conditions are satisfied:
R′P1 ≤ I(xp1;y2|xd2,u2),
Rd2 ≤ I(xd2;y2|xp1,u2),
R′p1 +Rd2 ≤ I(xp1,xd2;y2|u2). (160)
When the conditions in (160) are satisfied and for sufficiently large N , the following bound is
obtained using Fano’s inequality:
H(xNp1,x
N
d2|Wp1 = wp1,yN1 ,uN2 ) ≤ Nδ2. (161)
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Finally, the last term in (158) is bounded as follows.
H(xNp1,x
N
d2|Wp1,yN2 ,uN2 ) =
∑
wp1
P (wp1)H(x
N
p1,x
N
d2|Wp1 = wp1,yN1 ,uN2 ),
≤ Nδ2. (162)
Using (159) and (162), (158) becomes
H(Wp1|yN2 )
≥ N [Rp1 +R′p1 +Rd2 − I(xp1,xd2;y2|u2)− (δ2 + ǫ′)] , (163)
By choosing R′p1 = I(xp1;y2|u2) − ǫ′2 and Rd2 = I(xd2;y2|xp1,u2) − ǫ′′2 secrecy of the non-
cooperative private part is ensured. Thus,
H(Wp1|yN2 ) ≥ N [Rp1 − ǫ2] . (164)
This completes the proof.
N. Proof of Corollary 3
In the first and second time slots, transmitters 1 and 2 send the following encoded messages.
x1(1) = xcp[1](1) + xp1(1), and x2(1) = xcp[2](1) + xd2(1),
x1(2) = xcp[1](2) + xd1(2), and x2(2) = xcp[2](2) + xp2(2). (165)
In the following, the achievable secrecy rate and power allocation for different messages are
discussed in case of first time slot. In the following, the time index is omitted. The mutual
information given in Theorem 10 are evaluated as follows. From Theorem 10, R′p1 and Rd2 are
set as: 0.5 log
(
1 +
h2cPp1
1+h2
d
Pd2
)
and 0.5 log(1 + h2dPd2), respectively. Consider the first equation in
(38).
R1 = min
[
0.5 log(1 + σ2u1 + h
2
dPp1), 0.5 log(1 + h
2
dPp1) + min
{
0.5 log(1 + σ2u1), C
}]− R′p1,
(166)
The second equation in (38) reduces to following.
R1 ≤
[
0.5 log(1 + σ2u1 + h
2
dPp1 + h
2
cPd2), 0.5 log(1 + σ
2
u1 + h
2
cPd2) + min
{
0.5 log(1 + σ2u1), C
}
,
0.5 log(1 + h2dPp1) + 0.5 log(1 + σ
2
u1 + h
2
cPd2)
]− (R′p1 +Rd2). (167)
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The third equation in (38) reduces to following.
R1 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + h2dPp1 + h2cPd2) + 0.5 log(1 + σ2u1 + h2cPd2)− (R′p1 + 2Rd2). (168)
Consider the fourth equation in (38).
R2 = min
{
0.5 log
(
1 +
σ2u2
1 + h2dPd2 + h
2
cPp1
)
, C
}
. (169)
As Rd2 = 0.5 log(1 + h2dPd2) < 0.5 log(1 + h2cPd2), Rd2 satisfies the last inequality in (38).
Now, consider the power allocation for the private cooperative message, non-cooperative private
message and dummy message as shown below. The encoded messages at transmitters 1 and 2
are:
x1 = hdw1z − hcw2z + xp1, and x2 = hdw2z − hcw1z + xd2. (170)
To simplify the power allocation, the variance of w1z and w2z are chosen to be same. In order
to satisfy the power constraint, the following conditions need to be satisfied.
(h2d + h
2
c)σ
2
z + Pp1 ≤ P1, and (h2d + h2c)σ2z + Pd2 ≤ P2, (171)
where Pi = βiP (i = 1, 2) and 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1. The power for the non-cooperative private message,
cooperative private message and dummy message are chosen as follows:
σ2z =
θ1
θ1 + θ2
P1
h2d + h
2
c
, Pp1 =
θ2
θ1 + θ2
P1, and Pd2 = (P2 − (h2d + h2c)σ2z)+. (172)
where θi ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter θi and βi are the power splitting and power control parameter,
respectively. Hence, θi and βi are chosen such that the rate in (166)-(169) are maximized and
the minimum of (166)-(168) gives the achievable secrecy rate for the transmitter 1 i.e., R∗1(1)
and (169) gives the achievable secrecy rate for the transmitter 2. i.e., R∗2(1). In a similar way,
the achievable secrecy rate R∗1(2) and R∗1(2) can be determined in the second time slot. This
completes the proof.
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